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I. INTRODUCTION
This work comprehensively surveys the cases of the Supreme
Court of Florida that considered the bill of rights contained in article I
of the state constitution during 1991.1 It supplements the previous state
constitutional surveys published by the Review,' and adheres to the
same case selection criteria.3
1. Specifically, the survey summarizes all cases that the court released in slip
form during the period January 1 through August 15, 1991.
2. See David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-year Retrospective
on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV. 693 (1990) [hereinafter Decade Survey]
(concluding that the court's decisions create a hierarchical order of rights in article I,
with the order dependent solely upon the particular standard chosen to measure the
justification for the state's encroachment; that article I rights are not absolute, despite
rhetoric to the contrary; that article I rights eclipsed protections afforded by the federal
analogues on five occasions during the decade; that litigants should exploit the textual
differences between the state and federal constitutions, thereby advancing constitu-
tional imperatives that are unique to Florida; and that the court has promoted the
independence of the state constitution on several occasions when it eschewed relevant
federal precedent); David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the
State Bill of Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1049 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Survey] (identi-
fying a variety of doctrinal positions and principles of construction that drive the
court's constitutional logic; concluding that the court has accepted major responsibility
for protecting personal rights from governmental excess; and noting that article I rights
on two occasions surpassed the protections of their federal counterparts).
3. This survey accepts the premise that each opinion citing to the state bill of
rights, whether by principled analysis or passing reference, uniquely contributes to the
development of the Florida Constitution. In profile, the opinion must confirm that the
state constitution was relied upon by one or more members of the court, addressed by a
lower court, or advanced by a litigant in support of a claim. Conversely, an opinion that
generically refers to equal protection, double jeopardy, and the like, makes a less cer-
tain contribution to this body of law. Those cases are selectively included.
These case selection criteria allow one exception. Occasionally, the court simply
cites to another case to dispose of a constitutional issue and fails to mention that its
holding in the case under review has constitutional significance. See, e.g,, Blizzard v.
W. H. Roof Co., 573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991) (adopting opinion of district court that
construed three sections of the Florida Constitution, yet failing to indicate that its hold-
[Vol. 16
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No case more profoundly symbolizes the strength of article I than
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property." This featured
opinion establishes an analytical model for state due process, which
shields several article I rights from state encroachment by utilization of
a heightened level of judicial scrutiny, and illustrates that Florida prop-
erty rights are entitled to a level of protection that eclipses the protec-
tion afforded by federal analogues. Treatment of the decision appears
throughout the following material.' Like Real Property, several other
cases during this survey period granted relief for violations of personal
rights entirely on the strength of state constitutional law. One message
is clear-litigants should be encouraged to rely on article I with the
same confidence that they place on other principled bases of relief.
II. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
A. Basic Rights
Article I, section 2 makes three separate declarations of personal
rights. 'The first declaration expresses the central constitutional concept
that the state must deal with similar persons in a similar manner. The
second provides that all natural persons have inalienable rights, and
specifically enumerates several of those rights. The third expressly pro-
hibits the deprivation of any right on account of race, religion, 6 or
physical handicap.7 During this survey period, the court construed
ing has constitutional stature); Broward County v. LaRosa, 505 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1987)
(approving opinion of district court that construed article I, section 18, yet omitting
reference to the prohibition of administrative penalties in its opinion); State v. Castillo,
486 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1986) (clarifying State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984),
without signifying that it is necessarily deciding a constitutional question). Fortunately
this practice is the exception, not the norm, for subtlety has no place when the court
expounds the state's organic law. Cases of that ilk are included in this survey to the
extent that research successfully identified them.
In all, the court released 49 cases that considered the state constitution during the
seven-and-one-half-month survey period, and addressed 74 state constitutional issues.
Of those, 38 cases and 53 issues directly pertain to article I.
4. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S497, (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author)
(mandate issued Dec. 2, 1991).
5. See infra notes 20-24, 71-122, 282-88, 316-20 and accompanying text.
6. ]FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("There shall be no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof .... ").
7. There is no express textual basis in the federal equal protection clause for
treating race, religion, and physical handicap different from other classifications. Yet
federal constitutional analysis regards race as a suspect classification, and subjects
1991]
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rights guaranteed under each of these three clauses.
1. Equal Protection Clause
All natural persons are equal before the law . . . . FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2.
Two opinions by Justice McDonald this survey period relied on the
test of reasonableness to uphold various statutes that limited the expo-
sure to liability of certain classes of defendants from negligence suits
by injured plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing,
Inc.8 were injured in separate automobile accidents and sued the fi-
nance companies that leased the automobiles to the other drivers. The
plaintiffs proceeded principally on the theory that the lessors were lia-
ble for damages under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine,
which holds that the owners of motor vehicles are liable for injury
caused by the negligent operation of those vehicles by their agents.9
The lessors argued that they were not accountable for the plaintiffs'
injuries because they fell within an exception carved out by the legisla-
ture for long-term lessors of vehicles who maintained certain liability
insurance limits. 10
The court rejected the plaintiffs' common law argument. It ex-
plained that the legislature simply redefined the term "owner" of a mo-
tor vehicle, and excluded long-term lessors of automobiles. Moreover,
the court wrote that the legislative history of the statutory exception
showed that long-term leases were actually alternative methods of fi-
nancing vehicle purchases, which offered tax advantages to the les-
sors.1" It is unclear from the opinion why tax benefits of a long-term
race-based restrictions to "the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Other classifications accorded special scrutiny under federal
analysis are: gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); citizenship, Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); and legitimacy, Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). By expressly recognizing race, religion, and physical handicap,
the adopters of the state constitution have conferred a unique constitutional status on
those groups and have created an opportunity for Florida courts to extend protections
beyond the federal counterpart. Reason argues that those classifications, unlike classifi-
cations not enumerated, are entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny.
8. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
9. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
10. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1989).
11. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 334.
[Vol. 16
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lease should render the financing company less culpable under the dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine than had it executed a short-term lease.
A reasonable explanation for the holding is that long-term leases do not
retain for the financing company the traditional indicia of ownership
that would warrant holding it accountable under the doctrine for the
negligence of lessees or third parties. 2
Plaintiffs also advanced an equal protection challenge.13 The court
ruled that the statutory exception does not irrationally distinguish be-
tween the class of plaintiffs injured by vehicles leased for longer than
one year, and the class of plaintiffs injured by vehicles leased for less
than one year." Nor does the statute discriminate against the most
severely injured plaintiffs by eliminating long-term lessors as a source
of recovery, for plaintiffs retained the "unlimited ability to recover
from the lessee."'"
The other case, Blizzard v. W. H. Roof Co., Inc.,"8 dealt with stat-
utes of limitation that shortened the period for bringing negligence
suits against an insured tortfeasor whose insurance carrier became in-
solvent, and against the association established by law to cover claims
brought against insolvent carriers.' 7 The statutes reduced the period for
bringing suit from four years to one year, commencing at the deadline
established in the order of liquidation. Blizzard argued that the statutes
impermissibly created a subclass of insureds that was treated differ-
ently from members of the class as a whole.
A unanimous court adopted the opinion of the district court under
review, which ruled that the legislative choice to treat an insured
tortfeasor whose carrier became insolvent different from an insured
whose carrier remained solvent, was reasonably related to the stated
purpose of avoiding financial loss to claimants and policyholders alike.' 8
The statutory scheme assures injured claimants a mechanism for prose-
12. For instance, finance companies and long-term lessors may assume less.con-
trol of the leased automobile than do short-term lessors. Moreover, finance companies
may never see the automobile, or exercise a possessory interest over it during the term
of the lease.
13. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated due process and access
to courts. See infra notes 136, 296 and accompanying text.
14. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333-34.
15. Id. at 334.
16. .573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11(5)(d), 631.68 (1987).
18. Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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cuting damage claims that would otherwise go unsatisfied due to the
insolvency of the carrier. Moreover, it safeguards persons who sought
to protect themselves from liability by purchasing insurance policies.1 9
2. Inalienable Rights and Deprivation Clauses
All natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are
the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect
property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and
possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may
be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of
any right because of race, religion or physical handicap. FLA.
CoN sT. art. I, § 2.
Property, race, life and liberty were all considered this survey pe-
riod. We begin with property. Article I accords high stature to substan-
tive property rights. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop-
erty20 declared that the rights "to acquire, possess and protect
property" are among the most basic substantive rights protected by ar-
ticle I, section 2. A unanimous court found the procedures employed by
the state to execute a property seizure and forfeiture under the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act2 l were woefully inadequate to protect fun-
damental property rights safeguarded by this and other article I sec-
tions. Those rights are valued so highly that the initial restraint on
property must be accomplished by the least intrusive means under the
circumstances that are necessary to preserve potentially forfeitable as-
sets. 2 Moreover, the state is entitled to forfeiture only when it shows
by no less than clear and convincing evidence that the property was
used in violation of the act.2 3 The court imposed these and other "mini-
mal" due process standards on the state without regard to the particu-
lar type of personal property or real property that the state sought to
restrain. Because state due process is central to the protection of prop-
erty rights in this context, Real Property is treated fully under article
19. Blizzard, 573 So. 2d at 334.
20. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S497 (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
22. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500.
23. Id. at S501.
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1, section 924
The rights "to acquire, possess and protect property" are not enti-
tled to such stalwart protection when subject to state regulation in con-
texts less onerous than forfeiture. In 1990, the court in Shriners Hospi-
tals v. Zrillic" stated that the legislature is prohibited from restricting
property rights unless the restriction is "reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, [and] general welfare." 2 6 This year, the
court returned to that principle in Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd.,27 a
case that asked whether the legislature could permissibly deny the
owner of a mobile home park the right to evict the tenant mobile home
owners where that owner had decided to allow the land comprising the
park to become vacant. The mobile home park owner relied on section
723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which specifies limited circum-
stances when a park owner can evict tenant mobile home owners, in-
cluding change in use of the park land.
Martin Regency, the park owner, notified the tenant mobile home
owners of its intent to vacate its mobile home park. It provided the
requisite notice, but omitted any explanation for the anticipated
change. After the mobile home owners failed to timely vacate the park,
Martin Regency initiated proceedings to evict them. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Martin Regency, finding that it
complied with the notice requirements of section 723.061, and that it
was not required to state its intended use of the park, provided that it
did not continue to use the land as a mobile home park.2" The district
court affirmed. 9
In a split decision, a bare majority of four justices agreed to quash
the decision of the district court. The majority noted that mobile home
24. See infra notes 71-122 and accompanying text.
25. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
26. Id. at 68 (citing, in part, Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.
2d 881 (Fla. 1974)). The court wrote in Palm Beach Mobile Homes that the extent of
the personal right to use property must be determined in light of the prevailing social
and economic conditions, rather than as the framers and adopters intended, for the
legislature would otherwise become helpless to regulate and to extend that right to new
conditions, 300 So. 2d at 884 (citation omitted).
27. .576 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author; McDonald and Kogan, JJ.,
and Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurring; Overton, J., dissented with an opinion; Grimes,
J., dissented with an opinion in which Shaw, C.J., and Overton, J., concurred).
28. Id. at 1296.
29. Harris v. Martin Regency, Ltd., 550 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
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owners and mobile home park owners alike derive substantial property
rights from article I, section 2 of the state constitution. 0 For instance,
mobile home park owners enjoy a protected right to use the land com-
prising the park. Also, they need not accept tenancy of a mobile home
owner indeterminately. However, the court held that mobile home park
owners may offer the park for sale only if the sale is "'consistent with
the total circumstances' " and does not advance an evil sought to be
remedied by state regulation of the sale.31 The state regulates park
sales by imposing on the park owner the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing 2 and requires the park owner to give the home owner the
right of first refusal. 33 Those regulations, the majority agreed, served a
legitimate function by advancing the legislature's aim of protecting mo-
bile home owners from economic servitude and abuse by mobile home
park owners."' The majority regarded the regulations as permissible
only if "'reasonably necessary'" to secure the public welfare.3 5
The court acknowledged that nothing in the legislative scheme re-
quired a mobile home park owner to specify the nature of the proposed
change. It inferred from the statute a requirement that the change of
use must be valid. Because the record was unclear whether Martin Re-
gency intended to sell its land as vacant land (a permissible motive), or
to avoid extending to the home owners the right of first refusal (an
improper motive), the court determined that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact remained, and therefore the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for Harris Regency was inappropriate.
Three justices charged that the majority impermissibly created a
restriction on the sale of a mobile home park out of "whole cloth."36
Justice Grimes wrote that section 723.061(d) does not forbid the owner
from closing the park and selling the vacant land, and only guarantees
the mobile home owner ample time to relocate should the park owner
decide to change the use of the property. He claimed that the major-
ity's construction effectively provides that the owner may sell his or her
30. Harris, 576 So. 2d at 1296 (citing Stewart v. Green, 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla.
1974)).
31. Id. at 1297-98 (emphasis in original) (quoting Palm Beach Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 881, 888 (Fla. 1974)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 723.021 (1985).
33. FLA. STAT. § 723.071 (1985).
34. Harris, 576 So. 2d at 1296.
35. Id. at 1297 (quoting Shriners Hosps. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68 (Fla.
1990)).
36. Id. at 1300 (Grimes, J., dissenting; Shaw, C.J., and Overton, J., concurring.).
[Vol. 16
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land only when it is a mobile home park. He argued that such a con-
struction is itself an unconstitutional deprivation on the use of
property.3 7
Other cases addressed the prohibition against deprivation on ac-
count of race. The deprivation issue in Craig v. State3 concerned Palm
Beach County's jury selection procedures, which provided that petit ju-
rors were to be drawn from one of two districts that comprised discrete
geographic areas of the county at large. In a 1989 decision, Spencer v.
State,39 the court struck the districting scheme on two grounds. First, it
ruled that the administrative order creating the scheme "results in an
unconstitutional systematic exclusion of a significant portion of the
black population from the jury pool" of the district from which Spen-
cer's venire was selected."' Second, it held that the procedure violates
the equal protection clause of article I, section 2 of the Florida Consti-
tution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution because a black defendant charged with a crime in the
predominately white eastern district must be tried there, whereas a
white defendant charged with a crime in the predominately black west-
ern district may choose to be tried in the eastern district."' At the time
of Craig's trial, Spencer was pending appeal, and Craig filed a pre-trial
motion to draw the jury from the entire county, rather than from the
eastern district, the situs of his trial. The trial court denied the motion
as untimely, proceeded with the trial, and the jury ultimately convicted
Craig of numerous crimes, including first degree murder.
On direct appeal, the state argued that Craig could not rely on
Spencer, for he failed to reassert the claim after the trial court denied
his initial motion. The court rejected the state's procedural argument,
ruled that Spencer was dispositive, and remanded for a new trial.
Craig reaffirmed the principle of standing expressed in Kibler v.
State42 that a white defendant may challenge a jury selection process
37. Id. Justice Overton added that the majority risks that a federal court would
overturn section 723.061(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), on Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, id. at 1299 (Overton, J., dissenting), although it is doubtful that
a federal court would review Harris itself, for the decision is grounded exclusively on
the Florida Constitution.
38. 583 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
39. 545 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1989).
40. Id. at 1355.
41. Id.
42. 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989).
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that discriminates against racial minorities. 8 Reliance on Kibler for
this purpose is interesting, for the court there construed article I, sec-
tion 16's guarantee of an impartial jury to persons accused of crimes.
Thus, the constitutional right at stake was personal to Kibler. In Craig,
however, the constitutional right at stake was the right of prospective
jurors to be free of race-based discriminatory selection practices, a
right that they lacked standing to assert, and that only Craig could
effectively vindicate on their behalf. The equal protection clause and
impartial jury guarantee of article I protect congruent rights in this
context so that Craig had as much at stake in assuring jury impartial-
ity as the wrongfully-struck jurors. Craig reaffirms Florida's avowed
commitment to rid the courtroom of racially discriminatory jury selec-
tion practices through application of the doctrine of vicarious
standing. 5
Palm Beach County's jury districting scheme was also assailed in
Moreland v. State."' The opinion relies entirely on federal constitu-
tional principles, however, it is included in this survey because its hold-
ing is equally germane to future state constitutional litigation. More-
land, like Craig, was tried and convicted by a Palm Beach County jury
while Spencer was pending in the supreme court. Moreland argued at
trial that the jury plan violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments to
the federal constitution. The trial court rejected his claim, convicted
him of first-degree murder, and imposed a life sentence of imprison-
ment.4 The district court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct
appeal.4 8
Subsequently, the court released Spencer and Moreland relied on
that decision to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a
post-conviction relief motion. The trial court granted his motion, citing
Spencer. The district court disagreed and reversed. Citing Witt v.
43. Craig, 583 So. 2d at 1020; see also Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 4268, 4272
(U.S. Apr. 2, 1991).
44. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988).
45. Id.
46. 582 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author).
47. Id. at 619. Moreland also personally attacked the composition of the petit
jury in a pretrial motion by asserting that the county's racially discriminatory bias
against prospective black jurors violated the state constitution, State v. Moreland, No.
86-41-CF-A02 (15th Jud. Cir.) (Motion Relating to Composition of Petit Jury Panel
and Memorandum of Law in Support), however, abandoned the state claim in his mo-
tion for post-conviction relief.
48. Moreland v. State, 525 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
[Vol. 16
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State,"9 which held that only major constitutional law changes warrant
retroactive application in post-conviction proceedings,50 the district
court ruled that Spencer did not establish a new and different standard
of procedural fairness that would entitle Moreland to raise it
collaterally. 51
A unanimous supreme court quashed the opinion of the district
court and approved the trial judge's order granting Moreland a new
trial. Spencer was neither new law nor a major constitutional change in
the law, it said, but represented the first opportunity to apply existing
sixth amendment law to a new situation. 2 Although Witt declared that
the interests in decisional finality generally prohibit the retroactive ap-
plication of decisions of this order, the justices stated that the district
court erred by failing to acknowledge an exception to that principle.
Witt also declared that "'a more compelling objective . . . , such as
ensuring fairness and uniformity in individual adjudications,'" would
warrant abridging the doctrine of finality.5 3 The court applied Witt's
"fundamental fairness" exception in Moreland because it had twice
before granted relief to claimants who raised Spencer claims. Thus, the
"fundamental fairness" exception enables the court to assure decisional
consistency, and to avoid the patent miscarriage of justice that would
result when one post-conviction litigant is entitled to rely on a favorable
constitutional decision issued after the conclusion of direct appellate
proceedings, while another court bars a claim by a similarly situated
litigant.""
Reference to the Florida Constitution is conspicuously absent from
Moreland. There is no doubt that Moreland enjoyed state constitu-
tional rights that awaited vindication-Craig was issued only eight
days earlier on state equal protection grounds, and Spencer, the dispos-
itive case, was principally grounded on state equal protection. However,
the court in Moreland cannot be faulted for failing to peg its decision
on the state constitution. The explanation lies with Moreland's post-
conviction motion, which sought relief assertedly because trial counsel
was ineffective and because the jury violated the federal cross-section
49. 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).
50. Id. at 929-30 (footnote omitted).
51. State v. Moreland, 564 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
52. Moreland, 582 So. 2d at 619 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 620 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 925).
54. Id.
1991]
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requirement.55
Perkins v. State56 considered whether a state statute that made
unavailable the defense of self defense by a person who attempts to
commit a forcible felony violated due process and separation of pow-
ers. 57 The court held that the statute did not bar the defense under
circumstances when the defendant and the decedent were engaged in
attempted cocaine trafficking, and the decedent initiated the use of
deadly force against the defendant. Justice Kogan added in his special
concurring opinion that the right to fend off an unprovoked attack was
equally grounded in article I, section 2, which assures the inalienable
right to defend life and liberty. He wrote that "[the right to fend off
an unprovoked and deadly attack is nothing less than the right to life
itself," which enables a person to mount a reasonable defense or to
meet an unjustified use of force with force.58
B. Freedom of Speech and Press
Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for def-
amation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged
as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the
party shall be acquitted or exonerated. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Two opinions this period bear on the speech and press provision. In
CBS, Inc. v. Jackson59 the court considered a subpoena issued by the
defendant in a criminal proceeding that sought from CBS untelevised
videotapes, or "outtakes," of a law enforcement drug operation, which
depicted physical evidence of the defendant's arrest. CBS argued that
the "outtakes" were protected under the qualified reporter's privilege.
The court held that there existed no impediment under the first amend-
55. State v. Moreland, No. 86-41-CF-A02 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 22, 1989)
(Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, filed Feb. 2, 1989; Amendment to Motion for Post-
Conviction Relief and Memorandum of Law in Support).
56. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). Perkins is addressed more fully
under article I, section 9 (due process), infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
57. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1987).
58. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1314 (Kogan, J., specially concurring; Barkett, J.,
concurring).
59. 578 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
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ment or the state constitution to the compelled discovery of those
tapes. 60 It reasoned that the tapes do not risk drying up sources of in-
formation, and that certain information might eventually become un-
available to the public. Moreover, the disclosure of information con-
tained in the "outtakes" would not otherwise threaten the
newsgathering process.61 The court's holding applies with equal force to
unpublished film footage of an interview with a prison inmate and to
photographs of an automobile accident. 62 The opinion demonstrates
that Florida's speech and press guarantees are closely bound to first
amendment precedent under the circumstances presented.
Without passing on the merits, the court in In re Standard Jury
Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1)" approved standard jury instructions
for use in defamation cases. The Supreme Court Committee on Stan-
dard Jury Instructions (Civil) recommended three alternative jury
charges on liability issues in defamation cases. The court acknowledged
that briefs submitted by media representatives perceived constitutional
and common law deficiencies in the proposals.64
C. Rights to Assemble, Instruct, and Petition
The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct
their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances. FLA.
CONSST. art. I, § 5.
The defendant in Larson v. State65 entered a nolo plea to felony
witness tampering, and the trial court imposed probation, a condition of
which prohibited the defendant from entering Tallahassee for five
years. He argued on appeal that the condition violated his right to peti-
tion government under article I, section 5. Although the justices said
that the claim was procedurally barred for Larson's failure to raise it
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 700.
62. Id. at 700 n.2 (disapproving CBS, Inc. v. Cobb, 536 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), and Johnson v. Bentley, 457 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
63. 575 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 195; see also id. at 202 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (cautioning that the
standards do not have the force of law).
65. 572 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
McDonald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Ehrlich, J., concurred in result only
with an opinion).
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initially in the trial court, they reached the merits and concluded that
the condition of probation did not violate his constitutional right of pe-
tition, which assured him the opportunity to petition state government
by telephone or mail, or by contacting state officers outside Tallahas-
see.66 Moreover, Larson remained free to ask the trial court to modify
the condition of probation should he need to personally appear before
state officials in Tallahassee, and the trial court would be obliged to
grant his request.6 7
The right to petition for redress of grievances assures electoral ac-
countability-that persons will have the opportunity to make public of-
ficers and employees accountable for their acts. Writing for a unani-
mous court in Reynolds v. State, 8 Justice Kogan said in dictum that
accountability of public officials forms the bedrock of our democracy,
and partly explains the rationale for requiring the state to justify any
impermissible exercise of peremptory challenges to strike racial minori-
ties from petit jury venires. 69 This personal right turns on the right of
the public, whether members of a minority or not, "to assurances that
our courts are acting to eliminate past abuses. '"7 °
D. Due Process
Florida's due process section combines three categories of rights.
The first category creates the substantive rights of life, liberty, and
property that are safeguarded by procedural due process. The section
also includes two other fundamental guarantees that protect defendants
who are prosecuted criminally by the state. These categories are re-
garded generally as independent of due process-the protection against
double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination.
66. Id. at 1371-72.
67. Id.
68. 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
McDonald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring).
69. Id. at 1302; see also Tillman v. State, 522 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1988) (holding
that Neil has an equal protection component that derives from article I, section 2);
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (holding that impermissible race-based
strikes of prospective jurors violates a defendant's right to an impartial jury guaranteed
under article I, section 16).
70. Reynolds, 576 So. 2d at 1302.
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1. Life, Liberty or Property
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law . . . .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Four of the decisions that construed article I, section 9 this survey
period were unanimous, and notably, each rested explicitly, and exclu-
sively on Florida law. The first of those cases, Department of Law En-
forcement v. Real Property,7 1 is a case of singular importance for its
contribution to state constitutional doctrine. Mindful of its role as a
coordinate branch of state government, 72 the court, without dissent, up-
held the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act 73 against multiple constitu-
tional challenges, but resorted to a canon of constitutional interpreta-
tion to impose "minimal" due process requirements on the exercise of
the state's powers of seizure and forfeiture. Without this textual inter-
polation, the Act suffered from defects that were potentially fatal to its
continued existence. The opinion, written for the court by Justice Bar-
kett, deserves careful review.
The Act permits the state to seize property that is used in violation
of offenses enumerated in the Act, "or in, upon, or by means of which
any violation ...has taken or is taking place." 7 After arresting the
defendant on drug trafficking charges, the state initiated forfeiture pro-
ceedings against certain properties.75 The trial judge issued warrants to
seize the properties, based solely on an affidavit executed by a special
agent. As required by the Act, the state petitioned for a rule to show
cause why the properties should not be forfeited, 76 and also filed a no-
tice of lis pendens, which was not required.
The defendant, joined by amicus, moved to dismiss the petition on
constitutional grounds. The trial judge granted the motions, noting that
the defendant had not yet been convicted of any offenses that were
factual predicates for forfeiture, and holding that the Act facially vio-
71. '16 Fla. L. Weekly S497 (Aug. 15, 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author)
(mandate issued Dec. 2, 1991).
72. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (separation of powers).
73. IFLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
74. IFLA. STAT. § 932.703(1) (1989).
75. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497. Defendant's properties included a
60-acre tract of land with an airstrip extension, a 40-acre R/V mobile home subdivi-
sion with numerous full recreational vehicle hookups, entire 280 and 100-acre subdivi-
sions platted into separate lots or parcels, and a personal residence and property. Id.
76. Id. at S502 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (1989)).
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lated state and federal constitutions." Deciding that the trial judge's
order required immediate attention, a divided panel of the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal certified the matter to the supreme court.78 The
justices reversed the trial judge, and upheld the Act as facially consti-
tutional, provided, however, that it is applied in keeping with "mini-
mal" due process principles articulated in the opinion.
The court began by describing the process that is due under article
I, section 9. State due process includes a substantive and a procedural
component. Substantive due process protects "the full panoply of indi-
vidual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government.17 9
Procedural due process is a vehicle that protects substantive rights. It
does so by ensuring fair treatment through an orderly procedure that
includes notice, coupled with a real opportunity to be heard and to de-
fend before any judgment is rendered.80 The process that is due varies
with the character of the rights implicated and the nature of the pro-
cess challenged, and admits to no single, inflexible test.81
Turning to the act itself, the court noted several provisions that
potentially affront due process. For instance, the act "can be read to
mean" that a seizure immediately ousts owners and lienholders of their
interest in seized property. 2 It requires the state to "'promptly pro-
ceed'" against the property, once seized, by a rule to show cause, and
empowers the state to have the property forfeited "'upon producing
due proof'" that the property was used in violation of the act, although
it leaves those critical terms undefined. 8- The act bars suits to recover
seized property for ninety days after seizure unless the state fails to
initiate proceedings within that period.8' It restrains owners and
lienholders from defending until after seizure, and imposes on them the
77. Id. The trial judge struck down the act on grounds of substantive and proce-
dural due process, and because it failed to adequately define the scope of the state's
powers, thus rendering it void for vagueness and overbreadth. In re Real Property For-
feiture Proceedings, No. 90-250-CF (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 1990) (order and opin-
ion granting claimant's amended motion to dismiss petitions for forfeiture).
78. FLA. R. App. P. 9.125.
79. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
80. Id. at S498 (relying on State ex rel. Gore v. Chillingworth, 171 So. 649, 654
(1936)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at S501 n.7 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1) (1989)).
83. Id. at S498 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.704(1) (1989)).
84. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S498 (citing FLA. STAT. § 932.703(1)
(1989)).
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burden of proving in a forfeiture proceeding that they lacked scienter 5
In addition, the act fails to distinguish between real and personal prop-
erty, to :require preseizure notice and opportunity for the property
owner or lienholder to be heard, and to prescribe procedures for the
seizure itself.86
Seve:ral guiding principles direct the course of judicial analysis of
forfeiture statutes. Forfeiture is a harsh exaction that courts generally
disfavor. 7 Forfeiture statutes are strictly construed, but doubts are re-
,olved in favor of upholding them against constitutional attack.88 At-
tentive to its obligations to both establish rules that safeguard constitu-
tional rights and to respect the province of a coordinate branch of state
government,89 the court sought to determine whether the forfeiture act
"can reasonably be construed" to comport with "minimal" due pro-
cess.90 Unanimously, the court found that it could.
Real Property presented an issue untried in Florida. For guidance,
the court turned to federal cases, said to be highly persuasive and ex-
pressing principles embodied in the Florida Constitution. Among them
are the federal due process requirements of notice to the interested
party and an opportunity to be heard at an adversarial proceeding
before the government may seize property containing a residence, un-
less extraordinary circumstances justify postponing notice and hearing
until after seizure." Moreover, the "special significance" of residential
property necessitates " 'special constitutional protection.' "92 In that
85. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 932.703(2), (3) (1989)).
86. Id.
87. Id'. (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citation omitted).
89. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
90. This mode of statutory interpretation is not clearly dictated by precedent.
For instance, the court is disinclined to rehabilitate laws that suffer from vital omis-
sions or impermissible vagueness. See Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312-13 (Fla.
1991) (discussed infra note 138); State ex rel Williams v. Coleman, 180 So. 357, 360
(Fla. 1938) ("We are powerless to read into a statute . . . that which the Legislature
in its wisdom omitted . . . ."). Yet, the court believes that it should consider rehabili-
tative constructions of vague laws. See State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla.
1977) (unwilling to abandon its position of judicial restraint to rewrite a statute pro-
scribing "malpractice in office," when the statute is so vague and overbroad that it is
not amenable to a construction that would permit the court to resolve all doubts in
favor of its validity) (citing FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3).
91. Real Property, 16 Fla. W. Weekly at S499 (citing United States v. Premises
& Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989)).
92. Id. (quoting Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1264).
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vein, due process requires preseizure notice and hearing to minimize
the risk of erroneous deprivation. This respects the character of real
property, which unlike personal property, makes it unlikely to produce
exigencies that require means as restrictive as seizure.93
The state has at its disposal less restrictive means than seizure to
preserve potentially forfeitable assets. They include notices of lis
pendens, bonds, restraining orders, or some combination. The issuance
of an ex parte restraining order before notice to the owner or
lienholder, as example, is appropriate when a grand jury indictment
has already established probable cause to believe that property is sub-
ject to forfeiture. The restraining order merely removes assets from
control of the defendant temporarily, pending final judgment, and pro-
vides an opportunity for the state to establish a higher right to those
assets. 94 However, seizure after indictment is no less serious an en-
croachment than seizure before indictment. Therefore, federal due pro-
cess requires that the trial court reexamine probable cause at an adver-
sarial hearing to determine de novo whether continued restraint on the
property is necessary. 95
Florida due process plays a central role in protecting property
rights that are infringed when the state wields its powers of seizure and
forfeiture. Traditionally, courts and legislatures have measured the de-
gree of property protection from unjustified forfeiture based on the la-
bel attached to the forfeiture action itself. Real Property dispenses with
this practice as too "simplistic," and rejects the notion that due process
provides qualitatively different protection that depends on whether the
forfeiture is classified as civil (remedial), criminal (punitive), or quasi-
criminal. Instead, the court wrote, disputes over constitutional rights
must be decided by evaluating those rights, and when necessary, by
balancing the competing interests.96
Floridians have taken great care to make property rights secure
under the state constitution. Property rights are expressly protected by
article I, section 2, and they are numbered among the most basic sub-
93. Id. (citing Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1265).
94. Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991)
(en banc)).
95. Id.; Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1195.
96. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S502 n.15; see also United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989) ("The notion of punishment, as we commonly
understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and for
the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads.").
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stantive rights. For this reason, persons whose property the state re-
strains clearly have a compelling interest to be heard at the outset of
forfeiture proceedings to assure that the state has probable cause to
justify any restraint.9 7 Moreover, property rights are "particularly sen-
sitive" when the state seeks to forfeit residential property. This is di-
rectly attributed to several specific article I provisions that form a bar-
rier between the state on the one hand, and the home and personal
autonomy on the other.9 8
Next, due process requires a court to evaluate the justification for
the state; activity. The court said that the state advances "substantial"
state interests when it seizes and forfeits property that is used to facili-
tate trafficking in illicit drugs. Those state interests include punishing
criminal wrongdoers, seeking retribution for society, deterring the con-
tinued use of property to further criminal activity, remedying societal
wrongs, and recovering the costs of law enforcement.9 9 By characteriz-
ing the state's interests as "substantial," the court implies that the state
has satisfied an intermediate level of justification for its activity, one
less demanding than "compelling," 10 but more demanding than merely
"legitimate." 10 1 As it turns out, however, the characterization is not
particularly crucial in the forfeiture context. The defendant did not dis-
pute the strength or importance of the state's asserted aims, and the
thirty-eight page slip opinion lays the matter to rest in a single sentence
without citation.
More crucial to the outcome than the label attached to the state's
interests is the choice of standards by which the court measures the
level of protection due individual rights when the state wields its power.
Generally, when basic rights are at stake, article I, section 9 requires
the state to narrowly tailor the means chosen to accomplish its goals by
97. Id. at S499.
98. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights), 12 (security in the
home), and 23 (express right of privacy)). The seizure and forfeiture of property also
implicate other provisions designed to limit the exercise of state power. Id. (citing FLA.
CONST. art. I, §§ 17 (prohibition against excessive punishments), 21 (meaningful access
to the courts)).
99. id. at S499.
100. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (requir-
ing the state to show a "compelling" state interest before it intrudes into a person's
right to self-determine his or her medical course).
101. See, e.g., Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) (upholding anti-
obscenity law, in part, because the state has a "legitimate interest 'in stemming the tide
of commercialized obscenity' ") (citation omitted).
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using the least restrictive alternative. Because means less restrictive
than seizure were available, the state failed to satisfy this burden. Real
Property holds that Florida due process compels the state to employ
means less restrictive than seizure, where feasible, if it intends to pre-
vent the disposition of potentially forfeitable property before trial on
the forfeiture.' The holding underscores the high regard Floridians
have for the rights at stake, for very few article I rights receive greater
protection from state encroachment.'
Because the act failed to adequately shield basic rights from un-
justified ouster by the state, the court issued several rehabilitative pro-
cedural directives.104 Before initially restraining real property (by
means other than lis pendens), the state must provide notice and sched-
ule an adversarial hearing on the issue of probable cause. The state
must initiate proceedings by filing a petition for rule to show cause, and
simultaneously recording a copy of the petition in the official records of
102. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at 5499. Due process also requires the
state to provide notice to those with an interest in the property, and an opportunity to
be heard throughout the forfeiture proceedings. Id.
103. The most stringent standard announced for protection of article I rights re-
quires the state to show "overpowering public necessity" and "no alternative method"
of meeting the necessity. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (standard ap-
plied when the state abolishes a right of access to courts protected under article I,
section 21, and fails to provide a reasonable alternative). A standard less rigorous, but
one seldom satisfied, requires the state to show a compelling state interest that it ad-
vanced through the least intrusive means. See, e.g., Hillsborough County Governmental
Employees Ass'n, v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 362 (Fla.
1988) (article I, section 6, right to bargain collectively); Palm Harbor Special Fire
Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1987) (article I, section 2, inalienable
rights (classification based on alienage)); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wager-
ing, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985) (article I, section 23, express right of privacy).
See generally Decade Survey supra note 2 at 856 (maintaining that the court has
created a hierarchical order of article I rights that depends entirely on the standard
used to measure the justification for the state's encroachment).
104. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499-500. In other instances, the court
has resorted to its rule making authority to craft procedural protection for substantive
constitutional rights newly recognized in an opinion. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (prescribing procedures under article I, section 23
to safeguard the right of an incompetent patient to self-determine his or her medical
course without prior judicial approval); State v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1990)
(finding that statute, which authorized clerk to enter a final judgment by operation of
law when obligor defaulted on support payments, "should be interpreted" to allow the
obligor a hearing and the opportunity to present equitable defenses before entry of
judgment).
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the cleric. The recordation amounts to a seizure of real property. 10 5 The
state must immediately schedule an adversarial preliminary hearing
and notice all interested persons. In the event the state shows that it
has probable cause to believe that the seized property is subject to for-
feiture, the trial judge may protect the respective interests by order.
The adversarial hearing should take place within ten days of filing of
the petition for rule to show cause, and a decision on probable cause
should be "expeditiously completed.' 0 0
Due process does not require preseizure notice or hearing when the
state initially restrains personal property," 7 however, it does require
the state to send notice to interested persons after making an ex parte
seizure, and to afford them an opportunity to be heard at a postseizure
adversarial hearing. If requested, the adversarial hearing shall be held
"as soon as possible after seizure."' ° The trial judge must expedi-
tiously determine de novo whether the state had probable cause to pro-
ceed with the forfeiture, and whether continued restraint of the seized
property is warranted. 10
The opinion makes several points regarding litigation of property
claims under the act. Claimants are constitutionally entitled to a jury
trial on the ultimate issue of forfeiture, 1 0 a right that is subsumed
within state due process."' The state argued that it should be held to
no more than a preponderance standard of proof at trial on the forfei-
ture claim. However, Florida law expects more. Construing the "due
proof" requirement of the act, the court said that the state must show
by "no less than clear and convincing evidence" that the seized prop-
105. The act makes no provision for seizure of real property, such as by warrant
or writ, although seizure warrants were issued by the trial judge in this case.
106. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500-501.
107. Accord Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
Justice Brennan wrote that "seizure [of personal property] for the purposes of forfei-
ture is one of those 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing." Id. at 677 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972)).
108. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S500. The opinion is not entirely clear
on this point. See id. (anticipating that the hearing would occur within ten days after
seizure and "as soon as is reasonably possible"). The court also reaffirmed Lamar v.
Universal Supply Co., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985), which held that due process requires
"reasonably prompt" proceedings in forfeiture actions involving personal property. Real
Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S502 n.16. To the extent that there is disagreement
between Lamar and Real Property, the latter prevails. Id.
109. Id. at S500.
110. Id. at S501 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (access to courts)).
111. Id.
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erty was used in violation of the act before it is entitled to forfeiture.112
The higher standard is justified, the court said, because forfeiture im-
pinges on basic constitutional rights, often those of persons who are
innocent of wrongdoing."'
This is a marked departure from the prevailing practice in Florida
forfeiture cases. Formerly, the state was required to initially proceed by
a mere showing of probable cause that the property was subject to for-
feiture. Once established, the burden shifted to the claimant to rebut
the showing of probable cause. Alternatively, the claimant was required
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that no violation occurred,
or that an affirmative defense entitles the claimant to repossess the
seized property.""
In summary, there is no doubt that the court would have acted
within its prerogatives had it performed last rites on the forfeiture act,
affirming the trial judge and striking the act as sorely wanting protec-
tion for substantive rights. 13 While it may be argued that some justices
would have voted to overturn the act in its entirety, it is doubtful that
all would have concurred in the result. Thus seen, Real Property was
likely the product of compromise, realized through strenuous effort." 6
112. Id. Rather than imposing a fixed standard, the court allowed leeway for the
legislature to establish a higher evidentiary burden, such as the standard that governs
criminal prosecutions.
113. Id. Contra Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974) (noting that innocence of the property owner has almost uniformly been re-
jected as a defense to a forfeiture).
114. In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Dollars
($48,900.00) in U.S. Currency, 432 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
Under Real Property, the claimant is still held to a preponderance burden to establish
a defense that defeats a forfeiture action. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501.
115. The district courts often complained about the procedural shortcomings in
the predecessor versions of the 1989 act under review. See id. at S500 and cases cited
therein.
116. Given an earlier opportunity to consider the act in light of federal double
jeopardy, the court divided four to three. See State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 227
(Fla. 1989). The majority never reached the constitutional issue. However, three jus-
tices advocated a minority position that the vehicle forfeiture authorized by the act
violated the federal double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments, as ap-
plied, because the forfeiture penalty exceeded the compensation required to make the
state whole. Id. at 229 (Kogan, J., dissenting, with whom Shaw and Barkett, JJ., con-
curred) (citing Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1897). The rationale behind the double jeopardy
concern strongly parallels the court's proportionality analysis in Real Property, which
limits the state to the property or portion thereof that was used in connection with the
crime. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501. For a discussion of this aspect of the
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On the one hand, allowing the act to stand served those justices who
might have believed that it satisfied federal constitutional standards,
and that Florida provided no greater protection. On the other hand,
application of a judicial tourniquet of "minimal" due process require-
ments cured some of the potentially fatal defects that concerned those
justices who would have struck the act, partially or entirely.
This remarkable unity has several virtues. The choice permitted
the court to speak with clarity through one voice. Unanimity enhances
the precedential value of a decision, for it reflects the joint wisdom of
the court's membership. This is particularly important because the
opinion addresses constitutional rights of some magnitude. The decision
respects Florida's strong separation of powers doctrine by leaving intact
a forfeiture law, said to advance several "substantial" state aims. Fi-
nally, the result is politically savvy and practically appropriate. The
decision avoided piecemeal litigation that surely would have occurred
had the court overturned the act, leaving to the legislature the task of
enacting "minimal" protections of individual constitutional rights in
the aftermath. 117
Real Property establishes the analytical paradigm for article I,
section 9 due process. The opinion distinguishes substantive and proce-
dural due process as two discrete, functional components. The substan-
tive due process component forms the core of the state bill of rights,
shielding "the full panoply of individual rights" from unjustified inter-
ference by the state's political branches. This is a statement of great
amplitude.
It is beyond dispute that substantive due process protects expressly
declared constitutional rights, such as the rights "to acquire, possess
and protect property" under article I, section 2. Thus seen, personal
rights declared throughout the constitution give substantive content to
case, see infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
Another case decided this survey period suggests that the unanimity reached in
Real Property is an example of collegial accommodation. The justices were irreconcila-
bly split in Smith v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 573 So. 2d 320
(Fla. 1991), over a fundamental principle of due process-whether due process entitled
indigents to a free transcript of an administrative hearing to perfect their appeal.
Smith is discussed infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
117. The constant pressure from groups of constituents makes it unlikely that
legislators, and the voters, will care enough about preserving "'the balance of the Con-
stitution' 'to offset the votes of those whose interests will be disappointed." Learned
Hand, The Bill of Rights 12 in THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES (1958)
(citation omitted).
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article 1, section 9 due process. More interesting is the implication that
due process protects unspecified, unenumerated rights.' 8 That the
Florida Constitution should respect essential values that have no spe-
cific textual foundation is not surprising, for article I does not limit the
scope of its protections to rights expressly declared. " 9 In addition,
courts have acknowledged that protected rights derive from non-consti-
tutional sources. Among them are rights of individuals conferred by
state grant or entitlement, such as statute, regulation, ordinance, and
agreement. 120 Less clear is whether individual rights that derive from
relationships, contracts, custom, course of conduct, and the like are
similarly entitled to due process. The statement has the potential for
far-reaching impact and its full import must await the perspective of
later case development.
While a statement of general policy reserves important details for
adjudication in later cases, precedent cautions against ascribing a
meaning to the statement that exceeds the parameters of the decision.
The court has recently refused to be bound by archetypical statements
of constitutional principle outside the factual contexts in which they
were announced.1 2' With that caution Real Property's holding must be
118. See also Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499 (implying that privacy
protections derive from the inalienable rights clause of article I, section 2).
119. Compare FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 with U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
120. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 486, n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (specific rights attach "whether
the State uses a particular form of words in its laws or regulations, or indeed whether it
has adopted written rules at all"); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (declaring that property interests "are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits").
121. Compare In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990)
(describing privacy as a "'physical and psychological zone within which an individual
has the right to be free from intrusion or coercion,' " and deciding that Florida's ex-
press right of privacy protects a person's right to self-determine his or her medical
course, even if it means that death is certain to follow as a result of the choice) (cita-
tion omitted) and In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (stating that "'the
right to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,'" and declaring that it prohibits the state from requiring a minor female
to obtain parental consent before electing to terminate her pregnancy in the first tri-
mester) (citation omitted) with State v. Stall, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2888 (1991) (relying on precedent predating the adoption of Florida's ex-
press right of privacy to declare that no privacy rights arise in the context of commer-
cial sale or viewing of obscene material).
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seen as grounded on textually enumerated rights in article I, not on
peripheral rights or entitlements.
The procedural due process component requires fair treatment,
which includes notice and a real opportunity to defend before judgment
is rendered, whenever substantive rights are implicated. The applica-
tion of due process is dependent on the character of the interests at
stake, and the nature of the process involved. When fundamental prop-
erty rights are implicated, the state must justify its action to divest
those rights by showing that its action advances a substantial state in-
terest. And the state must employ the least restrictive means to exer-
cise an initial restraint on property, and show by no less than clear and
convincing evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.
Real Property is a fountainhead of state constitutional decision
making. 'The decision illustrates the court's willingness to dispose of
far-reaching constitutional questions entirely on the strength of the
Florida Constitution. This is no phenomenon, but a result made more
likely by the deliberate litigation of state constitutional claims at trial
and on appeal, by the high regard that Floridians have shown for prop-
erty rights in article I, and by an evolving line of precedent that urged
state law development. 2' If the significance of an opinion is measured
by the care that a state court takes to ground its holding firmly on state
law logic, then Real Property has few equals in the opinions of the
Supreme Court of Florida. The exclusive, explicit, and principled reli-
ance on articulated state law values of property, fairness, notice, and
meaningful hearing renders federal review improbable, and preserves
for Floridians a measure of property security and due process that sur-
passes federal constitution standards.
122. Although the opinion does not make the point, the court's case law suggests
that the time was ripe when Real Property reached the court to confront the state
constitutional claims attacking the forfeiture act. The historical progression begins with
Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978), where the court abided by express
legislative intent, and wrote that the 1975 version of Florida's contraband forfeiture
statute was to be construed "in uniformity" with its federal counterpart. Then,
Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1985), suggested the onset of a new era.
Duckham receded from Griffis, indicating that the extensive amendments to the act in
1980 required courts to look to state legislative intent, rather than federal precedent.
Finally, three justices dissented in State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1989)
(Kogan, J., dissenting, Shaw and Barkett, JJ., concurring), exposing the vulnerability
of the act to constitutional attack. They argued that the forfeiture of the defendant's
car under the act violated the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment,
because the forfeiture exceeded the compensation needed to make the state whole.
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The second unanimous case this period, State v. Rodriguez,128 like
Real Property, dealt with the notice aspect of due process. The state
charged Rodriguez by information with felony driving under the influ-
ence (DUI),2 4 a crime that is punishable as a felony of the third de-
gree provided the defendant has three or more prior DUI convictions.
The information omitted any reference to Rodriguez's prior convic-
tions. The court determined that proof of prior convictions is an essen-
tial element of the substantive offense of felony DUI.125 Relying exclu-
sively on the Florida Constitution, the court held that the fair notice
aspect requires the state to specifically enumerate in the accusatory in-
strument the defendant's three specific prior convictions for driving
under the influence. 2  The court overturned the felony DUI conviction
because the state failed to provide Rodriguez with any notice of his
prior convictions that it intended to rely on to establish felony DUI. 27
The opinion adds that the record contained insufficient evidence to
establish Rodriguez's prior DUI convictions,1 28 and leaves for another
day the question of whether a tender of proof alone might satisfy the
constitution's fair notice requirement.
The justices further agreed that another due process aspect, the
presumption of innocence, requires the trial court to withhold from the
jury any allegations or facts about the defendant's prior DUI convic-
tions. 29 Once the state proves the elements of the instant DUI offense,
the trial court is then required conduct a separate, non-jury proceeding
to determine the historical fact of the defendant's prior convictions. 30
123. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Barkett, J., author).
124. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b) (Supp. 1988).
125. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266.
126. Id. (citing art. I, §§ 9 (due process) and 16 (right of accused in criminal
prosecution to be informed of "the nature and cause of the accusation against him");
see also M.F. v. State, 583 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1991) (due process requires the state to
provide the accused with notice of the allegations in juvenile as well as adult criminal
proceedings, and does not prohibit the state from amending a petition of delinquency to
correct a good faith typographical error before the adjudicatory hearing).
127. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d at 1266-67.
128. Id. at 1266.
129. Id. at 1265-66.
130. Id. at 1266 (applying State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1978)). Harris
explained the due process implications of failing to determine out of earshot of the jury
the historical fact of convictions of similar crimes: "If the presumption of innocence is
destroyed by proof of an unrelated offense, it is more easily destroyed by proof of a
similar, related offense." 356 So. 2d at 317.
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The third unanimous due process decision, Burr v. State,18 1 va-
cated a death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing be-
cause the defendant had been acquitted of collateral crimes that the
trial court earlier relied on to establish three aggravating circumstances
in overriding the jury's recommendation of a life sentence. Finding that
two of the three aggravating circumstances rested "predominantly, if
not entirely," on some of the collateral crimes evidence, the court was
"forced to conclude" that the two circumstances are "reasonably sus-
pect," and inadmissible under article I, section 9 at a resentencing
hearing.13 The court rejected a conclusion that the error could be con-
sidered harmless in the penalty phase of a capital trial.133
Burr's harmless error analysis warrants brief comment. The court
wrote that the error was harmless in the guilt phase of Burr's trial, "in
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt discernible in our review of
the entire record."' 3' Without clarification, the statement risks its mis-
application. DiGuilio posed the precise harmless error inquiry as
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the ver-
dict, and it expressly rejected the overwhelming evidence test as a basis
for determining harmlessness.3 5 Despite appearances, Burr does not
depart from DiGuilio, and its statement should not be read to imply
that the court will find error to be harmless merely because the record
contained overwhelming evidence of guilt.
In the fourth case, Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.," 6 the
court rejected a due process attack against a statute that exempted
long-term lessors of vehicles who maintained certain liability insurance
131. 576 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 280; see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (vacating
death sentence when the sole prior conviction relied on by the sentencer to establish an
aggravating circumstance was later overturned).
133. Burr, 576 So. 2d at 280.
134. Id. (citation omitted). Compare Bruno v. State, 574 So. 2d 76, 80 (Fla.
1991) (finding error to be harmless, and stating that the record showed "overwhelming
evidence of guilt"), cert. denied, No. 90-812 (U.S. Oct. 7. 1991) with Dailey v. State,
No. 71,164, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Nov. 14, 1991) (finding error harmless in light of "other
substantial evidence of guilt") and Craig v. State, 585 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1991)
(same).
135. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at 1139; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23 (1967) (admonishing courts against overemphasizing a finding of overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt as a basis for concluding that error could not have affected the outcome).
136. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (McDonald, J., author). The case
is treated more fully under equal protection, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text, and access to courts, see infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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limits. The court said that the exemption bore a reasonable relationship
to a permissive legislative objective. 13 7
In the following three cases, no opinion won majority approval,
although the justices reached unanimous positions. In Perkins v.
State,' the court overturned Perkins' conviction of murder in the first
degree and attempted cocaine trafficking. Perkins and Guy agreed to
buy cocaine through Lazier, their codefendant. Perkins and Lazier ap-
proached Kimble, the prospective seller. Instead of selling them co-
caine, Kimble tried to rob Perkins and Lazier of their purchase money
at gun point. In the ensuing struggle, Kimble shot Perkins, but Perkins
succeeded in seizing Kimble's gun and shot him dead.' 39
The state conceded at trial that Perkins shot Kimble in self-de-
fense, but argued that Perkins was barred from raising the legal claim
of self-defense under the statute, which made the defense unavailable
to a person who attempts to commit a forcible felony. The statute de-
fines "forcible felony" under the catchall clause to be "any other felony
which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against
any individual."' 40 The trial judge granted Perkins's motion to dismiss
the murder charges. However, the third district reversed, finding that
the crime, trafficking in cocaine, qualifies as a "forcible felony" be-
cause it inherently involves a propensity to do violence. 4
The state supreme court quashed the opinion of the district court.
The court began with a fundamental principle of statutory construc-
tion, due process requires a court to strictly construe penal statutes ac-
cording to their literal text, and in a manner most favorable to the
accused. The court ruled that the term "involves" was vague and am-
biguous, and failed to place narcotics trafficking within the conduct
proscribed in the statute.""
Another case, Anderson v. State,"3 borrowed from established
137. Id. at 333-34.
138. 576 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). Perkins is also addressed under
article I, section 2 (inalienable rights), supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 1311.
140. FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
141. State v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 537, 538-39 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
142. Perkins, 576 So. 2d at 1313-14. The court added that the rule of strict
construction was a necessary rule of self-restraint, equally required by the doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in article II, section 3 of the state constitution. Without
the rule, courts could use "some minor vagueness" to extend the meaning of a statute
beyond the text enacted by the legislature. Id. at 1312-13.
143. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDon-
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federal doctrine to declare that the state violates Florida's due process
guarantee when it prosecutes a person on charges known to be based on
perjured material evidence. However, the court rejected Anderson's
claim that his indictment for first-degree murder was based on the per-
jured testimony before the grand jury of his accomplice woman-friend,
turned accuser. The court wrote that her testimony was not materially
false, and thus would not have affected the grand jury's decision to
indict or the petit jury's truth-seeking function. 144
At least three justices believed that state due process provided the
dispositive principles in the following two plurality decisions. However,
the fractured opinions make a less certain contribution to article I. The
court in Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services1 45
accepted review of ,a claim by various petitioners, all of whom were
indigent, that they had a statutory and a constitutional right to receive
without charge transcripts of administrative hearings in order to per-
fect their judicial appeal from unfavorable administrative rulings. Six
justices agreed that indigents were entitled under section 57.081(1),
Florida Statutes (1985), " 6 to receive transcripts of administrative pro-
ceedings at no cost.147
The petitioners also advanced a claim that they were entitled to
receive transcripts under principles of state due process. " 8 Justices,
Overton, Grimes, and McDonald joined in the per curiam opinion and
rejected the constitutional claim, while Chief Justice Shaw concurred
in result. They relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
aid, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Ehrlich, J., concurred with an opinion in which Shaw,
C.J., and Kogan, J., joined; Barkett, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion; Kogan, J., concurred in result only).
144. Id. at 91-92.
145. 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Overton and Grimes, JJ., con-
curred; Shaw, C.J., concurred in result; McDonald, J., concurred in part and dissented
in part with an opinion; Ehrlich, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion in which Barkett and Kogan, JJ., joined).
146. The section provides that indigent parties to an administrative proceeding
shall receive "the services of the courts, sheriffs, and clerks, with respect to such pro-
ceedings, without charge."
147. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 323 (Overton and Grimes, JJ., concurring); id. at 325
(Shaw, C.J., concurring in result); id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part; Barkett and
Kogan, JJ., concurring); see also Gretz v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
572 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1991) (holding that agency rule requiring payment for a copy of
hearing transcript and record violated statute prohibiting the charging of fees).
148. The petitioners advanced a second constitutional argument under the access
to courts provision. See infra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
1991]
29
Hawkins: Constitutional Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Ortwein v. Schwab, which had considered a related issue. 149 Ortwein
affirmed an Oregon court, construing Oregon law, which ruled that
welfare recipients were not entitled to a waiver of an appellate court
filing fee to seek judicial appeal of an administrative ruling, following
an evidentiary hearing, that had affirmed an agency decision reducing
their welfare benefits. Federal due process did not require the state of
Oregon to waive costs that would permit an indigent to file an appeal,
and that the existence of the alternative evidentiary hearing, which was
not conditioned on the prepayment of a filing fee, sufficed under the
circumstances. 150 It was "'inconceivable,'" the per curiam opinion
reads, that Florida's statute requiring prepayment of transcript costs is
any less rational.' 5' "We see no compelling reason to construe Florida's
due process clause differently than its federal counterpart with respect
to this issue. Since petitioners received an evidentiary hearing on their
claims without cost, we do not believe that they would be constitution-
ally entitled to be furnished with a free transcript to assist in the prose-
cution of their appeals."'' 5
The per curiam position provoked a strong dissent, and exposed a
deep-rooted division over the meaning of due process. Writing for three
members of the court in dissent, Justice Ehrlich argued that a party
could not be bound personally by an administrative decision until he or
she had meaningful access to a judicial tribunal, which necessarily in-
cluded a transcript of the administrative proceeding. 5 3 Moreover, the
court had earlier declared in an equally applicable equal protection
context that indigents were entitled to challenge their involuntary hos-
pitalization in a manner commensurate with the appellate review avail-
able to nonindigents.154
149. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
150. Id. at 658-59 (relying on United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46
(1973) (upholding statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing fees, in part, because Kras'
resort to the bankruptcy court was not his sole path of relief); see also Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (striking state statute requiring prepayment of fil-
ing fee by indigent seeking divorce because Connecticut courts provided the "exclusive
precondition" for obtaining a divorce).
151. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 324 (quoting Harrell v. Department of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs., 361 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 325 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurring) (relying on Scholastic Sys. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166
(Fla. 1974)).
154. Id. (relying on Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1978)).
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Smith departs from the well-settled providential rule which states
that the court should avoid deciding a constitutional question when it
can dispose of the issue on nonconstitutional grounds.15 Because six
justices clearly agreed that indigents are statutorily entitled to a tran-
script free of charge, the court had no need to reach the constitutional
claim.15 Despite its dubious precedential importance as a constitu-
tional decision, Smith adds a gratuitous measure of understanding to
the field, and displays a willingness by the justices to share their views,
however disparate. Both results are welcomed by those who follow
carefully the court's labors.
Walls v. State5 7 also produced a plurality decision and three opin-
ions. The state prosecuted Walls for a double homicide. Suspecting that
he was involved in other murders, the state asked a correctional officer
to conduct a surveillance of Walls while he awaited trial in detention.
The officer assured Walls that his comments to her would remain confi-
dential, and discouraged Walls from telling his attorney. The officer
took detailed notes of Walls' statements, which the state gave to its
examining psychiatrists. Following evaluation, two of the state's psychi-
155. See Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1978), receded from on other
grounds, Duckham v. State, 478 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985); Palm Beach Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Strong, 300 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199,
201 (Fla. 1969).
156. It is not entirely clear why the court issued Smith in violation of the provi-
dential rule. The per curiam opinion, concurred in by Justices Overton and Grimes,
indicates that the constitutional issue was reached because the matter had been "exten-
sively argued." Smith, 573 So. 2d 323. Other recent cases suggest more appropriate
rationale that guide the court to addressing a constitutional claim when other disposi-
tional bases exist. See, e.g., Davis v. State, No. 76,640, slip op. at 3 n.* (Fla. Oct. 31,
1991) (declining to impose procedural bar and reaching merits to emphasize that no
error occurred); Mac Ray Wright v. State, 586 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Fla. 1991) (revers-
ing convictions on dispositive claim, and addressing other constitutional errors to in-
struct the trial court in the event of retrial); Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167
(Fla. 1991) (reaching the merits of the constitutional challenges on its own, "given the
importance of th[e] case," and even though petitioners failed to show entitlement to
relief, id. at 1171; addressing petitioners' separation of powers claim "for future guid-
ance only." Id. at 1173). But see id. at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring; Barkett,
J., concurring); id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Shaw, C.J.,
and Kogan, J., concurring) (arguing that the challenged act violated the single subject
rule, thus disposing of the case, and that the majority inappropriately addressed addi-
tional constitutional claims).
157. 580 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., author. Shaw, C.J., and Barkett, J.,
concurred. Grimes, J., concurred in result; McDonald, J., dissented with an opinion
with which Overton, J., concurred).
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atrists opined that Walls was competent to stand trial. The trial court
accepted the opinions of the psychiatrists and proceeded to trial. The
jury convicted Walls of murder, and recommended the death sentence,
which the trial court imposed.1 8
On direct appeal, Walls argued that the correctional officer's activ-
ities violated his constitutional rights. A majority of the justices agreed,
although two of the opinions chose different rationale. Justice Kogan
wrote that the state engaged in illegal subterfuge, which required the
court to conduct an "intensive scrutiny" of the particular method used
by police to extract the statements from Walls. 15 9
The state conceded at trial that the police conduct violated Mas-
siah v. United States,60 and further agreed that Walls' statements
were properly excluded from the guilt phase and penalty phase of his
trial. Relying exclusively on Florida due process, Justice Kogan wrote
that the gross deception practiced by the state required the trial court
to exclude the statements from all aspects of Walls' trial, thereby
prohibiting the state from gaining advantage from the subterfuge on
matters relating to Walls' competence to stand trial. 6 ' The practice
violated the due process tenants of fairness and good faith, and degen-
erated from permissible accusation to impermissible inquisition. 6 2 The
court ordered the case remanded for a new trial on all issues, and
barred the use of psychiatric evaluations conducted by the original psy-
chiatrists who received information derived from the Walls' detention
statements.
Justice Grimes concurred in result only, and simply wrote that
Massiah precluded the use of testimony by the mental health ex-
perts.' 63 In dissent, Justice McDonald characterized the police activity
as "inappropriate gathering of facts surrounding one's competency,"
which did not equate to a due process violation. Had the state's action
led to a confession or been introduced as substantive evidence, he
wrote, reversal would more likely be warranted."'
State due process arguments appeared in dictum and a minority
158. Id. at 132.
159. Id. at 133.
160. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
161. Walls, 580 So. 2d at 134.
162. Id. at 133. The police conduct here also interfered with the attorney-client
relationship, protected by article I, section 9. Id. at 134 (citing Haliburton v. State, 514
So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987)).
163. Id. at 135 (Grimes, J., concurring in result only).
164. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting; Overton, J., concurring).
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opinion in the two remaining cases. The court in Clark v. State'6 de-
clined to consider a claim that separate sentences imposed on the same
day and in the same court, but by different judges, resulted in
sentences that combined to violate the recommended guidelines sen-
tence. The court ruled that Clark was procedurally barred from raising
the claim on appeal because he failed to ask the trial court to consoli-
date his sentencing proceedings. Recognizing that the underlying prob-
lem would persist in future cases, the court established a general rule
that one sentencing score sheet must be used for each pending case. It
further recognized an exception to that rule that allowed defendants to
move to delay sentencing of pending cases to permit the use of a single
score sheet. 66 In dictum, the court wrote that due process protects de-
fendants against extreme delay occasioned by a rule that would post-
pone sentencing until all pending cases are ready for sentencing, such
as where the delay results in an unreasonably long period of incarcera-
tion in anticipation of sentencing. 167
A four-justice majority in Espinosa v. State' 8 rejected Espinosa's
claim that he was entitled to be tried separate from his co-defendant on
multiple charges, including murder. The majority reasoned that Espi-
nosa was not entitled to severance simply because he testified and was
cross-examined by his co-defendant's counsel. Moreover, no evidence
was introduced at his trial that could not have been introduced against
either defendant, if each had been tried separately. Although Espinosa
was unable to cross-examine his co-defendant during the guilt-inno-
cence phase of his trial, because his co-defendant did not testify, Espi-
nosa was able to cross-examine him during the penalty phase. 69
Two justices in dissent relied on Florida's due process clause to
argue that severance should generally be allowed in the guilt phase of a
capital trial. Moreover, the requirement for an individualized punish-
ment in death cases dictates that severance always be allowed in the
penalty phase. This is particularly so when the co-defendants exhibit
extreme animosity, and an elevated antagonism. 17 0 The inherent unfair-
165. 572 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, Ehrlich, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J., specially concurring
with opinion).
166. Id. at 1392.
167. Id. at 1390.
168. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S753 (Nov. 27, 1991) (per curiam).
169. Id. at S754; see also Beltran-Lopez v. State, 583 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1991)
(per curiam).
170. Espinosa, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S756 (Barkett, J., dissenting, Kogan, J.,
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ness of jointly trying co-defendants under those circumstances is that
"'a substantial possibility exists []that the jury will unjustifiably infer
that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.' "171
2. Double Jeopardy
No person shall. . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
... .FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Federal case law provides a frequent source of precedent for
resolving state double jeopardy claims. Robinson v. State17 2 relied on
Oregon v. Kennedy17 3 and rejected a claim that double jeopardy barred
retrial due to asserted prosecutorial overreaching where the record did
not establish that the prosecutor deliberately intended to provoke
Robinson into moving for a mistrial. 117 Robinson, a black man, was
charged with first-degree murder of a white woman whom he kid-
napped, robbed, and sexually battered. Robinson maintained that the
prosecutor, during cross examination of a defense witness, insinuated
that he habitually preyed on white women.
Unable to agree on which federal precedent suggested the better
reasoned outcome, the justices in Goene v. State175 predictably split
their decision. Goene misrepresented his identity at sentencing and re-
ceived a guideline sentence of four and one-half years' imprisonment
following his conviction of various crimes. Afterward the state learned
of Goene's true identity and that he had an extensive criminal history,
which would have resulted in a guideline sentence of twelve-to-seven-
teen years' imprisonment had that fact been taken into account. The
state moved to vacate Goene's sentence. After Goene began serving his
sentence, the trial court granted the state's motion and resentenced
Goene to seventeen years' imprisonment. He argued that a resentence
concurring).
171. Id. (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1981)).
172. 574 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author. Shaw, C.J., and Overton,
Grimes, and Kogan, JJ., and Ehrlich, Senior Justice, concurred. McDonald, J., con-
curred in result only), cert. denied No. 40-8277 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991).
173. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
174. Robinson, 574 So. 2d at 112-13 (relying on Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S.
667 (1982)).
175. 577 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, J3., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion, in which
Kogan, J., concurred).
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to a greater term after he began serving the original sentence violated
the state and federal double jeopardy clauses.1"6
Four of the six justices participating in the decision rejected
Goene's claim of error. The majority acknowledged that the double
jeopardy clause was intended, in part, to avoid subjecting a criminal
defendant to repeated insecurity, which would occur were he or she not
entitled to rely on the finality of the court's action.'" The general rule,
followed in Florida, prohibits a court from resentencing a defendant to
an increased term of imprisonment once he or she has begun serving a
sentence.' 78 However, a defendant's fraudulent behavior in securing a
sentence produces no "'legitimate expectations' " of constitutional fi-
nality." 9 Unlike a jury verdict of acquittal, a sentence imposed through
the defendant's fraud may be assailed on appeal. This conclusion de-
rives equally from the trial court's inherent power to assure the orderly
function of the judicial process by rectifying "'at any time'" its orders
and judgments that are the product of fraud. °80
Two justices argued in dissent that the exception carved out by the
majority ran afoul of the very purpose of the double jeopardy clause.
Constitutional finality requires the state "to marshall all the evidence
and present it at one time, not in a piecemeal fashion."' 8' Here, the
state failed to supply evidence of Goene's identity at the original sen-
tencing hearing, or to seek a continuance and await a forthcoming fin-
gerprint identification that would have established Goene's true
identity. 82
Carawan v. State' continues to have precedential importance in
resolving claims that prosecution or sentencing of multiple charges aris-
ing out of a single act violates Florida law, even though the decision
176. Id. at 1306-07.
177. Id. at 1307 (relying on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
178. Id. at 1308 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 1307-08 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980)); see also United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632
(lth Cir. 1983).
180. Goene, 577 So. 2d at 1309 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Burton,
314 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1975)).
181. Id. at 1310 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1311 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990) (reasoning that
double jeopardy barred a subsequent prosecution where the state was capable of prose-
cuting all charges in a single proceeding).
183. 515 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1987).
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was overruled by the legislature effective July 1, 1988.8 Carawan con-
trols pipeline cases, that is, cases with direct appeals pending at the
time the decision became final,188 and cases alleging the occurrence of
criminal activity before July 1, 1988.
The Second District Court of Appeal certified a question in a se-
ries of cases that asked whether double jeopardy barred prosecution
and sentence for sale and possession (or possession with intent to sell)
of the same quantum of cocaine. The lead decision, State v.
McCloud,18' dealt with prosecutions for those crimes allegedly occur-
ring on June 9, 1988, and on August 1, 1988. Relying on the dictates
of Carawan, the court said that the trial judge properly dismissed the
June 9th possession charge.1 87 However, section 775.021(4)(b), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1988), called for the opposite result concerning the Au-
gust 1st offenses. That section authorized multiple convictions and
sentences for offenses based on a single act, unless, for instance, it was
a lesser-included offense. McCloud argued that the offense of posses-
sion was subsumed by the offense of sale, and fell within the exception.
Rejecting that claim, the court ruled that an offense is a lesser-included
offense under that section "only if the greater offense necessarily in-
cludes the lesser offense,"' 88 and sale is not a lesser-included offense of
possession because it can occur independent of possession. The court
also ruled that the legislature prohibited it from examining either the
pleading or proof to determine whether the defendant possessed and
sold the same quantum of cocaine."
The court ruled in State v. Hollinger 90 that Carawan did not pro-
hibit the state from seeking to convict a defendant for the multiple
offenses of first-degree premeditated murder and use of a firearm dur-
184. State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 617 (Fla. 1989) (construing FLA. STAT. §
775.021(4) (1987)).
185. Rehearing was denied in Carawan on December 10, 1987.
186. 577 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, JJ., concurred; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion in which
Kogan, J., concurred); see also State v. James, 581 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1991); State v.
Oliver, 581 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1991); Davis v. State, 581 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1991); State
v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d
157 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Gillette, 580 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1991) (per
curiam); State v. Dukes, 579 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. V.A.A., 577
So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); State v. White, 577 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1991).
187. McCloud, 577 So. 2d at 940.
188. Id. at 941 (emphasis in original).
189. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
190. 581 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Grimes, J., author).
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ing the commission of a felony, allegedly occurring on October 1, 1987.
Carawan specifically stated that those crimes did not violate double
jeopardy, a conclusion which it attributed to "'the legislature's mani-
fest concern over the proliferation of violent crimes involving the use of
firearms.' "191 The court added that the intervening changes to section
775.021(4) since Carawan did not mandate a different result.192
Finally, Justice Grimes in State v. Zanger'93 reiterated that
Carawan was limited to single act analysis, and rejected the defend-
ant's claim that the decision prohibited multiple convictions of robbery
and dealing in stolen property. He explained that Zanger robbed his
victims and then sold their jewelry the following day, thus committing
crimes based on separate acts. 9"
E. Prohibited Laws
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts shall be passed. FLA. CONST. I, § 10.
Florida courts adhere to the standard announced in Weaver v.
Graham'95 when deciding whether the application of a statute violates
the prohibition against ex post facto laws under the state constitution.
Weaver established that a statute impermissibly violates the federal ex
post facto prohibition if it applies to events that occurred before its
enactment, and operates to disadvantage the offender against whom it
is applied. 96 For that reason, the court in Hernandez v. State 9' con-
cluded that a law that requires the affirmance of a departure sentence
comprised of a single valid reason for departure, even though other in-
191. Id. at 154 (quoting Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 169). More likely, it meant to
say that those crimes proscribed different conduct, which would permit the state to
prosecute them both without violating double jeopardy.
192. Id.
193. 572 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1991) (Shaw, C.J., author; Overton, McDonald, Ehr-
lich, and Grimes, JJ., concurred; Barkett and Kogan, JJ., dissented).
194. Id. at 1380; see also Henderson v. State, 583 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1991)
(unanimous, Barkett, J., author) (adopting rationale of Henderson v. State, 572 So. 2d
972 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), and holding that state could separately convict and
sentence under Carawan for theft and uttering a forged instrument when both offenses
arose from a single transaction and the defendant actually receives another's property).
195. 450 U.S. 24 (1981). See State v. McGriff, 537 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1989).
196. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
197. 575 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
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valid reasons are also relied on, could not be applied against a defend-
ant whose crimes occurred before the enactment of the law. 198 The
court vacated the sentence after finding one of two reasons given in
support of a departure sentence was invalid. It left open the question
whether a law that makes the burden of proof for departure reasons
less burdensome similarly violates the ex post facto clause.' 99
F. Searches and Seizures
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications
by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued
except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or per-
sons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall
be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Only a single decision, Department of Law Enforcement v. Real
Property, °0 relied on article I, section 12 this year. Together with sev-
eral other state constitutional rights, this section prohibits the state
from intruding into the sanctity of the home and the maintenance of
one's personal life when it seeks to execute its seizure and forfeiture
powers, unless it first complies with minimal due process require-
ments."0' The court's authoritative reliance on the state search and
seizure provision illustrates that the provision enjoys a vitality that has
not been completely eviscerated by the conformity requirement.
The clearest opportunity to consider article I, section 12 as a
source of protection, independent of the Fourth Amendment, presents
198. Id. at 641 n.1 (relying on McGriff, 537 So. 2d at 109).
199. Id.
200. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
201. Id. at S499 (also citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights), and 23
(privacy)).
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itself when the facts are outside Fourth Amendment precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. Yet, even then, the section may prove to
be unreliable. Until Florida v. Bostick,2 °0 the United States Supreme
Court had not considered the specific Fourth Amendment implications
when the government searches boarded passengers on commercial car-
riers. There, the Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of
Florida that struck down a law enforcement drug interdiction practice,
which consisted of plain-clothed narcotics officers, without a whisper of
suspicion of wrongdoing, boarding scheduled busses, confronting pas-
sengers, and requesting consent to search their carry-on luggage for
contraband. 0 3 In light of circumstances that the trial judge character-
ized as "very intimidating,"" 4 a majority of the state court determined
that Bostick was seized under article I, section 12 and the Fourth
Amendment. Applying the standard announced in United States v.
Mendenhall,0 5 the majority concluded that Bostick was neither free to
leave, nor to " 'disregard the [officers'] questions and walk away.' "20
A six-member majority of the United States Supreme Court
charged that the Florida court had misread Mendenhall by "focusing
on whether Bostick was 'free to leave' rather than on the principle that
those words were intended to capture."20 The correct formulation
under the Fourth Amendment, Justice O'Connor wrote for the major-
ity, "is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the of-
ficers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." ' 0 Relying on
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado,09 where INS
agents conducted a factory sweep in search of illegal aliens who might
be found inside, she wrote that there is no seizure where persons have
"'no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to an-
swer.' "110 The opinion chastises the state court for focusing on a "sin-
202. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
203. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989), rev'd, I11 S. Ct. 2382
(1991).
204. Id. at 1157.
205. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
206. Bostick, 554 So. 2d at 1157 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
207. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
208. Id. The dissent agreed that this formulation correctly expressed the Men-
denhall standard, although it would have answered the question differently. Id. at 2389
(Marshall, J., dissenting; Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
209. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
210. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218).
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gle fact-that the encounter took place on a bus," to adopt a per se
rule.2 11 Declining to answer for the moment whether a seizure occurred
when narcotics deputies confronted Bostick in the rearmost seat of his
bus, the Court remanded for a decision on this issue by the Florida
courts.
G. Pretrial Release and Detention
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by
life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presump-
tion is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of
municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release
on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasona-
bly protect the community from risk of harm to persons, assure
the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the
judicial process, the accused may be detained. FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 14.
No decision construed this section during the survey period, al-
though a rules amendment has potential constitutional importance.
Without ruling on the constitutional aspects of its decision, a divided
court amended the rule establishing time standards for the state to
charge pretrial detainees. Five justices in In re Amendment to Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.133(b)(6) (Pretrial Release)2 12
agreed to amend the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure to require
the state to file formal charges against defendants in custody within
thirty days from the date of their arrest or service of capias. If the
defendants remain uncharged on the thirtieth day, the rule requires the
court to order the defendants automatically released on their own re-
cognizance on the thirty-third day, unless the state files formal charges
by that day; or if the state shows good cause, to order the defendants
automatically released on their own recognizance on the fortieth day,
unless the state files formal charges by that day.213 The rule provides a
benchmark for establishing a constitutional minimum when the stan-
211. Id. at 2388. But see id. at 2392 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Black-
mun and Stevens, JJ.). Justice Marshall wrote that the state supreme court considered
"all of the details of the encounter," suggesting that the majority was unfaithful to the
record. Id. (emphasis in original).
212. 573 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
213. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.134 (renumbering FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b)(6)).
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dards are tested under the light of the adversarial process.
Of note, the majority rejected a rules committee proposal that
would have authorized the state, with good cause, to detain a defendant
beyond forty days without filing formal charges. 14 Proving that some
court conferences must be uproarious, Justice Overton objected to the
majority's forty day rule, charging that it was borne in the court's "bo-
som," rather than in the rules committee. He characterized the rule as
"mandatory [and] inflexible, 2 15 and added that the rule will now re-
sult in "games being played with the process" that thwart the desired
effect of the mandatory cut-off period. For instance, he predicted that
"most state attorneys will be filing informations based on hearsay evi-
dence from investigating officers," rather than on sworn testimony of
material witnesses, to avert the release of uncharged defendants.2 1
H. Rights of Accused and of Victims
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand,
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have
the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at
trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both,
and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the
county where the crime was committed. If the county is not
known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or
more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was commit-
ted in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused
may elect in which of those counties he will be tried. Venue for
prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the
state shall be fixed by law.
(b) Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the
next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be
214. The proposed rule provided, in part:
Unless the state can show good cause why the charging instrument has not
been filed, the defendant shall be released from custody on his or her own
recognizance. Any defendant who remains in custody after the 30th day
[without formal charges] shall be brought before a magistrate at least
every ten days thereafter, until the charging document is filed or defendant
is released from custody.
In re Amendment, 573 So. 2d at 826 n.*.
215. Id. at 828 (Overton, J., dissenting; McDonald, J., concurring.).
216. Id. at 829.
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informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all cru-
cial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights
do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
Article I, section 16(a) creates a cluster of rights designed to serve
persons who are subject to criminal prosecution. Second to article I,
section 9 (due process), rights in this cluster are the most actively liti-
gated article I rights. Half of those cases addressed the right to trial by
an impartial jury.
1. Notice of Charges
The requirement that the state inform a defendant of "the nature
and cause of the accusation against him" embodies the due process
concept of fair notice. In State v. Rodriguez,21 7 a unanimous court re-
lied on the two companion provisions to overturn Rodriguez's convic-
tion for felony driving under the influence (DUI) because the state ne-
glected to give him any notice of the particular prior DUI convictions it
intended to rely in proving the enhanced felony DUI offense. Because
the state ultimately was required to prove that Rodriguez had three or
more DUI convictions, as an essential element of felony DUI, it was
required to specifically allege the prior convictions in the charging
instrument.2 18
2. Fair Trial
A juror's use of unauthorized materials may implicate the right of
a fair trial, in particular the rights of confrontation, cross examination,
and assistance of counsel, guaranteed to the accused under article I,
section 16 and the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. In
State v. Hamilton,"' the state appealed a trial court ruling that or-
dered a new trial as to the penalty phase in the capital trial because
one juror brought two unauthorized magazines into the jury room.
Noting that no Florida case had yet formulated a test for measuring
the error caused by a juror's use of unauthorized documents, and stat-
ing that there could be no bright-line test, the court adopted a federal
217. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). This case was introduced above. See supra
notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
218. Id. at 1266.
219. 574 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
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test that attempts to balance the accused's constitutional right to a fair
trial and the juror's privacy right to be shielded from needless prying
and harassment. 2 °
Under Hamilton, the moving party bears the initial burden of es-
tablishing the breach by stating a legally sufficient reason for con-
ducting an interview of the jury. Defense counsel alleged that the unau-
thorized magazines distracted the jury because one included a single
advertisement that depicted a blonde woman wearing a bathing suit.221
The court said that the trial judge could have summarily denied de-
fense counsel's motion for a new trial based on counsel's allegations, for
the allegations expressed counsel's reaction to the advertisement and
not the juror's reaction. The trial judge conducted a hearing, even
though he harbored "serious doubt" about the existence of miscon-
duct.22 The court commended the trial judge, but hastened to add that
a judge need not conduct an interview if the allegation of misconduct is
"unreasonable. "223
When the movant provides a legally sufficient reason for interview-
ing the juror, the misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice. The burden then shifts to the state to show that the breach
was harmless:22 4 "'[D]efendants are entitled to a new trial unless it
can be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the [unautho-
rized materials] affected the verdict.' "25 The inquiry must be "'lim-
ited to objective demonstration of extrinsic factual matter disclosed in
the jury room,' "226 and may not extend into matters relating to the
juror's subjective thoughts, impressions, or mental processes.2 In
Hamilton, the justices agreed that the error was harmless, particularly
because the unauthorized materials were irrelevant to the factual and
220. Id. at 128, 130; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.607(2)(b) (1987). The test may
also be viewed as preserving the station of the jury itself by impermissibly delving into
matters that inhere in the verdict, Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d
97, 99 (Fla. 1991) (citation omitted), and averting improper second-guessing of ver-
dicts. Id. at 102 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d at 130.
222. Id. at 130.
223. Id. (emphasis in original).
224. Id. (citing United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975)).
225. Id. at 129 (quoting Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir.
1972)).
226. Id. (quoting Howard, 506 F.2d at 869); see, e.g., Trotter v. State, 576 So.
2d 691 (Fla. 1991) (upholding trial court's finding that evidence failed to support alle-
gations that law books and a telephone in jury room improperly influenced the jury).
227. Hamilton, 574 So. 2d at 129.
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legal issues of the case. 28
Because Hamilton may be read to authorize an inquiry, even
though the trial judge harbored serious doubt about the merits of any
alleged juror misconduct, a realigned court "clarified" its decision in a
civil case, Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler2 29 A four-justice
majority held that "an inquiry is never permissible unless the moving
party has made sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a
trial court to order a new trial using the standard adopted in Hamil-
ton." 2 3  Thus, an inquiry is permissible if it will elicit information
about overt prejudicial acts, and is impermissible if it will elicit infor-
mation about a juror's subjective thoughts. 31 In Baptist Hospital, at-
torneys for the defendant hospital sought to interview jurors following
the verdict for the brain-damaged infant plaintiff and against the hos-
pital. They presented affidavits, alleging essentially that the verdict was
an agreement borne out of sympathy for the plaintiff, and that the jury
relied on nonrecord evidence of the hospital's insurability. The court
ruled that the affidavits were legally insufficient, because they alleged
facts that merely purported to be opinions of two jurors about the rea-
son for the verdict, sought to delve into the jurors' subjective impres-
sions, or were otherwise refuted by the record. 2
Justice Kogan, who authored Hamilton, concurred in the court's
continued adherence to the decision, but dissented for what he saw as
an effective overruling of Hamilton's threshold inquiry. He would au-
thorize a "very limited" interview of jurors, to permit inquiry into ob-
jective acts that would establish whether jurors agreed to disregard
their oaths and instructions, and whether nonrecord evidence was
received.23 3
3. Right to Counsel
A majority of the court in McKinney v. State 8 affirmed the de-
228. Id. at 131.
229. 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDon-
ald, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring. Kogan, J., concurred in part and dissented in
part with an opinion in which Harding, J., concurred).
230. Id. at 100 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 99.
232. Id. at 99-100.
233. Id. at 101 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part; Harding,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
234. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991) (Barkett, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Grimes and
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fendant's convictions, but declined to hear a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel. McKinney reaffirms the court's practice of re-
quiring defendants who claim that they received ineffective assistance,
including those that assertedly impinge article I, section 16, to prose-
cute their claims in a motion for post conviction relief. Generally, di-
rect appeal is an inappropriate time to initiate a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel because the trial judge has had no opportu-
nity to consider and rule on the evidentiary basis of the claim . 3 5
Unable to garner additional votes, Justice Overton dissented alone
on this point, arguing that the holding sets bad precedent by encourag-
ing multiple litigation. He would have declined for the moment to
reach the merits of McKinney's other claims, preferring instead to re-
mand for an evidentiary hearing and await the outcome on the ineffec-
tive assistance claim."'
The right to present mitigating evidence in capital cases is consti-
tutionally guaranteed. The question posed in Anderson v. State"'
asked whether a defendant's waiver of that right amounts to a waiver
of effective assistance of counsel, thereby implicating enhanced proce-
dural protections. For reasons not clear from the record or opinion, An-
derson instructed his attorney not to present evidence at the penalty
phase of his capital trial. He argued on direct appeal that his decision
effectively amounted to a waiver of effective assistance of counsel for
which the trial court was required to ascertain that the waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial colloquy reflected that de-
fense counsel advised the court that his investigation identified numer-
ous persons who could provide mitigating evidence, but that Anderson
commanded him not to call any. Anderson declared on the record that
he preferred not to have any witnesses testify on his behalf. The trial
court's inquiry was limited to a solitary question-whether Anderson
was on drugs or medication that would affect his understanding of the
proceedings. Anderson replied that he was not.238 Ultimately, the trial
court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the death
penalty.
Kogan, JJ., concurring; McDonald, J., concurred in part, and dissented in part, without
an opinion; Overton, J., dissented with an opinion).
235. Id. at 82.
236. Id. at 85 (Overton, J., dissenting) (citing unreported order in Francis v.
State, No. 50,127 (Fla. June 20, 1978)).
237. 574 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3259
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1991).
238. Id. at 89-90, 94-95.
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A majority affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding
that the trial court was not obliged to conduct further inquiry. 39 It
specifically rejected Anderson's claim that the trial court was required
to ascertain whether the waiver of his right to present mitigating evi-
dence, which amounted to a waiver of his right to effective assistance of
counsel, satisfied Faretta v. California.4 0 The majority reasoned that
Faretta's standard for protecting a defendant who seeks to exercise the
right of self-representation did not apply because Anderson was repre-
sented by counsel.241
The decision to forego presenting mitigating evidence, Justice Bar-
kett argued in dissent, raises the specter of "the most dire consequences
possible under the law. '24 2 The right to present mitigating evidence is
constitutionally guaranteed, and is no less important than the right to
plead guilty to a capital crime. The latter requires an affirmative show-
ing on the record that the defendant tendered his or her plea intelli-
gently and voluntarily. 43 She wrote that Anderson was entitled to an
equivalent degree of procedural protection, which should not be sus-
pended "'simply because the accused invites the possibility of a death
sentence.' "2,4 Moreover, a full inquiry into the effectiveness of a de-
fendant's waiver, on the record, promotes finality of the judicial pro-
cess, which is otherwise lost on collateral proceedings "'that seek to
probe murky memories.' "9245
4. Right to Appeal
Article I of the state constitution does not expressly create a right
of appeal. And State v. Gurican2"6 casts doubt on whether other consti-
239. Id. at 95 (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, JJ.,
concurred).
240. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
241. Anderson, 574 So. 2d at 95. Justice Ehrlich concurred separately, stating
that he would dissent on this point had the colloquy between the trial judge, defense
counsel, and Anderson not occurred. He added that the colloquy was "sufficient to
meet any constitutional requirement." Id. (Ehrlich, J., concurring; Shaw, C.J., and Ko-
gan, J., concurred.).
242. Id. at 96 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
243. Id. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
244. Id. at 97 (quoting Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 1988)).
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. 576 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Over-
ton, Ehrlich, Barkett, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Kogan, J., dissented without
opinion.).
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tutional sources may provide such a right.2"" There the court addressed
for the first time whether a defendant who fled the jurisdiction of the
trial court before sentencing and filing her notice of appeal is entitled
to appeal her conviction if she returns to the jurisdiction before the
state files a motion to dismiss the appeal. Justice McDonald, writing
for a majority of six members, noted that but for Gurican's voluntary
absence from the jurisdiction, the trial judge would have rendered a
judgment sentencing her. Justice McDonald explained that Gurican
forfeited whatever right to an appeal she possessed by fleeing the juris-
diction of the trial court, and showing overt disrespect for the judicial
system, which she could no longer rely on for protection. 248
Although Gurican does not foreclose the matter, it seems unlikely
that future claimants will successfully argue that the state constitution
provides a right of appeal to persons who comply with procedural rules.
The majority distinguished its earlier decisions that found that a de-
fendant had a constitutional right of appeal, explaining that those deci-
sions construed jurisdictional provisions of former constitutions. ' 9
Moreover, the majority disagreed with a district court decision, which
found a state constitutional right to appeal, and characterized its rea-
soning as "debatable. '2 50
5. Impartial Jury
Florida adheres to a determined policy to rid its trial courts of
race-based jury selection, and the appearance of impropriety that such
a practice fosters. The focus of this effort has been on the entitlement
of defendants in criminal cases to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed
247. See id. at 711-12 n.2 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) ("[d]istrict
courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter
of right . .. ")). The matter would seem to be foreclosed by State v. Creighton, 469 So.
2d 735, 740 (Fla. 1985), which construed the section as merely allocating jurisdiction,
rather than conferring a right to appeal. See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
656 (1977) (noting that there is no federal constitutional right to an appeal, and that
the right of appeal in criminal cases is purely a creature of statute); Estelle v. Dor-
rough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975) (noting that there is no federal constitutional right to
state appellate review of state criminal convictions).
248. Gurican, 576 So. 2d at 711.
249. Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
250. Id. (citing Marshall v. State, 344 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.)
(Grimes, J., author) ("Our Florida Constitution guarantees convicted persons of the
right of appeal . . . ."), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1977)).
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in article I section 16. It is noteworthy that other article I sections
provide coordinate protection against racially discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges,2 51 and that the protection extends to litigants and
jurors in civil proceedings.252 Also, the court has declared in dicta that
the state itself is entitled to a fair trial, free of discriminatory
impediments."'
Florida's current standard for reviewing claims of racial bias in
the jury selection process was announced in the 1984 decision State v.
Neil.254 The standard essentially provides that the moving party must
first make a timely objection that the other party improperly exercised
a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror on account of race.
Then the movant must demonstrate a prima facie case on the record
that the juror belongs to a distinct racial group, and that there is a
"strong likelihood" that the peremptory was entirely racially motivated.
Once the movant demonstrates the existence of a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the other party to show that it struck the prospective
juror for a valid, non-racial reason.2 55 The court considered six cases in
the Neil case line this period, proving that its standard continues to
demand the court's attention as the single-most litigated right in the
cluster of article I, section 16 rights.
Defense counsel in Williams v. State"6 established a prima facie
case of discrimination by objecting to the state's removal of two blacks
251. See Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (noting in dictum that
article I, section 5's right to petition officials for redress of grievances assures accounta-
bility of public officials of the sort advanced by requiring the prosecutor to explain a
race-based exercise of a peremptory challenge); Tillman v. State, 522 So. 2d 14 (Fla.
1988) (relying on state and federal equal protection clauses).
252. Mazaheritehrani v. Brooks, 573 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990),
rev. granted, No. 77,692 (Fla. July 11, 1991); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause prohibits discrimination on account of race in selecting a jury in a
civil proceeding).
253. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984). The Neil case line to date
focused entirely on the rights of defendants and jurors in criminal trials to be free of
race-based discriminatory practices in the selection of jurors. No case has yet reached
the court asking it to apply Neil to remedy impermissible defense selection practices,
although at least one district court considered the point. See Cure v. State, 564 So. 2d
1251, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
254. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 481 (Fla. 1984), clarified, State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d
18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
1986).
255. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 486-87.
256. 574 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
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from the jury. However, after the prosecutor explained the decision to
remove the first black juror, the trial judge prevented the prosecutor
from explaining the decision to excuse the second black juror. This was
error, the court ruled, because the trial judge should have resolved all
doubts in favor of the defense and conducted an inquiry. Relying on
State v. Slappy 57 the court declared that "'[i]f we are to err at all, it
must be in the way least likely to allow discrimination.' "258 Therefore,
"[w]henever a sufficient doubt has been raised as to the exclusion of
any person on the venire because of race, the trial court must require
the state to explain each one of the allegedly discriminatory chal-
lenges."'2 "'9 That error here required remand for a new trial.
Williams is instructive for several reasons. The opinion illustrates
circumstances when the defense may satisfy the "strong likelihood" re-
quirement of establishing a prima facie case under Neil simply by cre-
ating "sufficient doubt" on the record that the state improperly struck
even a single juror. It also shows the court's intolerance of and the
severe consequences to the state for its unjustified, race-based juror
selection.260
Defense counsel failed to show a "strong likelihood" of improper
discrimination in Taylor v. State," 1 where the prosecutor removed one
of four black members of the venire. The trial judge rejected counsel's
assertion that the prosecutor was "systematically excluding" blacks,
and refused to require the prosecutor to explain his peremptory." ' The
record failed to show a Neil violation, and the court held that the mere
fact that the prosecutor challenged one of four black members does not
show "substantial likelihood" of an improper peremptory, particularly
when the prosecutor knew, under the procedure followed for jury selec-
tion, that another black juror would succeed the excused juror to the
257. :522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
258. Williams, 574 So. 2d at 137 (quoting Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22).
259. Id. at 137 (emphasis in original); see Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300,
1301 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author) ("strong likelihood" of discrimina-
tion exists when the prosecutor removes the only black member of the venire); see also
Taylor v. State, 583 So. 2d 323, 327-28 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (trial court need not
look back to the prosecutor's reasons for strike of second black venire member when
defense accepts prosecutor's withdrawal of the peremptory challenge).
260. The court expressly stated in another case that it has the highest regard for
the integrity and skill of the state's prosecutors, and does not ascribe to them a racist
sentiment. Reynolds, 576 So. 2d at 1302 (Fla. 1991).
261. 583 So. 2d 323, 327 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
262. Id.
1991]
49
Hawkins: Constitutional Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
panel.268
Not infrequently the court addresses the standard of reviewing the
trial judge's Neil rulings. Neil established a deferential standard of re-
view, where it emphasized that "the trial court's decision as to whether
or not an inquiry is needed is largely a matter of discretion. 264 Later
the court said that the trial judge "necessarily is vested with broad
discretion in determining whether peremptory challenges are racially
intended . . . . [and] we must necessarily rely on the inherent fairness
and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who
themselves get a 'feel' for what is going on in the jury selection
process. 265
With those principles in mind, four of six members of the court
participating in Green v. State266 sustained the decision of the trial
judge to deny defense counsel's Neil claim, which was prompted when
the prosecutor excused two black jurors. The majority wrote that the
trial judge "sees and hears the prospective jurors, . . . has the ability
to assess the candor and the credibility of the answers given to the
questions presented. Clearly, the trial judge is in the best position to
determine if peremptory challenges have been properly exercised. 267
Having reviewed the record, the justices declared: "we cannot say that
the trial judge abused his discretion ....
The factual basis of the majority's decision in Green was seriously
called into doubt in Justice Barkett's dissenting opinion.269 Engaging in
a careful review of the voir dire proceedings, she identified several in-
stances where the majority had passed over voir dire testimony of cau-
casian jurors, who went unchallenged by the prosecutor, and yet pos-
sessed qualities that resulted in the dismissal of blacks.
The majority made no attempt to reconcile the dispute raised by
Justice Barkett. The unexplained impasse allows room for speculation
263. Id. at 326 n.3, 327.
264. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487 n.10; see also Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 24.
265. Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 1990).
266. 583 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, and Grimes, JJ., concurring; Barkett, J., dissented with an opinion, with which
Kogan, J., concurred.).
267. Id. at 652 (citation omitted).
268. Id. But see Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (on
motion for rehearing) (panel split on whether Neil rulings by trial judge should be
resolved by abuse of discretion standard, or whether state's reasons must be supported
by competent, substantial evidence).
269. Green, 583 So. 2d at 653 (Barkett, J., dissenting; Kogan, J., concurring.).
[Vol. 16
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/5
Hawkins
that the majority is unlikely to hold the state to exacting certainty. 270
Green also suggests that the majority tends to defer to the trial judge's
factual findings in Neil rulings, even though a perusal of the record
contains facts that suggest the findings were erroneous. 7' Moreover,
the existence of record inconsistency will not necessarily convince the
justices to find error after a Neil inquiry.
Deference to the station of the trial judge on the issue of discrimi-
natory intent is clearly not warranted in all circumstances. For in-
stance, the court refused to defer to the trial judge in Reynolds v.
State2 72 because she failed to conduct any sort of Neil inquiry. There,
the state peremptorily struck the sole black juror on the venire. The
trial judge agreed with the prosecutor that there was no "systematic
exclusion," and summarily denied defense counsel's Neil objection.2 73
Because the excusal of the entire black membership on a venire raises a
"strong likelihood" of impropriety, the trial judge should have con-
ducted a Neil inquiry to ascertain the prosecutor's motives, but errone-
ously never did.
Generally, the court will not reach the merits of a Neil claim that
is procedurally barred. This period, the court declined to consider
claims in two cases because trial counsel failed to preserve the issue for
appeal. The first case, Valle v. State,2 74 illustrates the importance to
the movant of understanding the mechanics for asserting a Neil claim.
At trial, defense counsel charged that the prosecutor's exercise of pe-
remptory challenges to remove six blacks and two Hispanics from the
jury created "an impropriety in the record. 176 The trial judge stated
that he would allow the prosecutor to respond, but noted that "'I've
270. See Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22 (misuse of a preemptory is indicated by "a
challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged");
see, e.g., Gadson v. State, 561 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
271. See Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298,1303 (Fla. 1990) (McDonald, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) (dissenting on decision to grant new trial for Neil
violation, and arguing that "it is manifest from the record that the peremptory chal-
lenges were not racially motivated"); Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710, 716 (Fla. 1989)
(McDonald, J., dissenting, Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (independently reviewing the rec-
ord and concluding that there was no possibility of racial overtones that would warrant
overturning the trial court ruling rejecting Neil claim); Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 24 (Fla.
1988) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (no showing that the trial judge abused his
discretion),
272. 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1991) (unanimous) (Kogan, J., author).
273. Id. at 1300-01.
274. 581 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous).
275. Id. at 43.
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been asked to make no findings and I am making no findings'" that the
state acted improperly.27 6 After the prosecutor volunteered reasons for
striking the eight jurors, the defense objected only that the challenges
were used to create a death-prone jury.
The record suffered from three defects, each of which could have
been independently fatal. First, the record makes clear that defense
counsel unartfully pled a Neil claim. Second, counsel should have
asked the trial judge to expressly find that the defense had carried its
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial bias. Fi-
nally, counsel failed to show that the reasons advanced by the prosecu-
tor were racially motivated. 7 8
The court also declined to consider a Neil claim raised collaterally
in Francis v. Barton .1 9 Although Neil was issued in 1984, after Fran-
cis appealed his conviction and sentence, Francis's failure to assert a
Neil violation in his first collateral attack procedurally barred him from
seeking to litigate the claim in his second collateral attack. 80 The ma-
jority denied all relief. Two justices specially concurred, but wrote to
argue that the case should have been remanded for a review of the
claim on its merits. They advanced a minority position that every con-
stitutional claim in a death case should be reviewed on its merits.
Moreover, they would have excused the procedural bar because Fran-
cis's direct appeal was in the Neil pipeline and the court issued its opin-
ion on the direct appeal after it released Neil. 81
I. Excessive Punishments
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture
of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of
witnesses are forbidden. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Article I, section 17 prohibits, in part, "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or
unusual punishment, ... [and] forfeiture of estate." Seldom have
276. Id.
277. Id. at 44.
278. Id.
279. 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Mc-
Donald, Grimes, and Harding, JJ., concurring. Barkett, J., concurred specially with an
opinion with which Kogan, J., concurred.).
280. Id. at 584-85.
281. Id. at 585 (Barkett, J., specially concurring, Kogan, J., concurring).
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courts construed this section. The two references to article I, section 17
in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property282 are therefore
exceptional, and for their brevity might go unnoticed. The court de-
clared that Floridians have, under this section, a substantive right to be
free from "excessive punishments. ' 1"83 The phrase seems to borrow di-
rectly from the caption above the section, for it has no literal, textual
derivation. This suggests that the phrase is only of general importance
because the text of a constitutional section, and not its title, determines
its construction.2 84 In light of the facts and following discussion, how-
ever, the phrase "excessive punishments" effectively captures the spirit
of the section, and establishes a principle akin to Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis.2 8
The court also declared that article I, section 17 limits the state to
forfeiting property of a defendant that was used in the predicate crime,
or alternatively, prohibits the state from forfeiting property that was
not an instrument of criminal activity.2 86 The state had alleged at trial
that the defendant used portions of the properties, or improvements, to
facilitate drug trafficking activity. It did not allege that the defendant
used the entirety of the seized properties in that activity.2 87 Under the
ruling, the state may not forfeit property that was not related to further
the predicate drug offense without violating the defendant's right to be
free from "excessive punishments." This is a marked departure from
federal Eighth Amendment case law, which permits forfeiture of the
whole, even though the criminal activity pertained to a part.188 The
282. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497. For an extended discussion of this case, see
supra notes 71-122 and accompanying text, and infra notes 282-88, 316-20 and accom-
panying text.
283. Id. at 5499. This right is protected by the notice and hearing requirements
of article I, section 9. Id.
284. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h).
285. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (Eighth Amendment pros-
cribes punishment that is disproportionate to the crime committed).
286. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S501 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ .9
and 17).
287. In re Real Property Forfeiture Proceedings, No. 90-250 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.
Dec. 21, 1990) (order and opinion granting claimant's amended motion to dismiss peti-
tions for forfeiture).
288. See United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1990)
(as applied, statute subjecting the whole of any tract of land used to facilitate narcotics
distribution permits forfeiture of apartment building as a whole, rather than specific
apartments, and does not violate eighth amendment proscription against disproportion-
ate punishment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One 107.9
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decision illustrates an important principle of federalism-that the state
may extend greater protection to persons from governmental excess
than they are entitled to under the federal counterpart.
J. Access to Courts
The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
In its 1973 decision, Kluger v. White,"8 the court declared that
article I, section 21 prohibits the legislature from abolishing a statutory
right of access to the courts that predated the adoption of the Florida
Constitution, or that became part of the state's common law. Despite
its commitment to preserving an avenue of redress through Florida's
courts, Kluger recognized that the demands of society and the "ever-
changing character of the law" may on occasion justify the abolition of
an enduring right of action. The court announced that the legislature is
free to abolish a personal right of access if it provides a "reasonable
alternative" to protect the right, or otherwise shows an "overpowering
public necessity" for abolishing the right and that no alternative
method exists to satisfy that necessity. " ' As the following two cases
illustrate, Kluger's "exacting standard" continues to serve as the cor-
nerstone of the court's article I, section 21 case law.
Various taxpayers, employers, employees, and others opposed re-
cent comprehensive changes to Florida's workers' compensation law.
They claimed in Martinez v. Scanlan,291 in part, that the 1990292
Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990) (statute making all real prop-
erty, or part, subject to forfeiture does not violate Eighth Amendment's protections
against cruel, unusual, and disproportionate punishments). The identical conclusion
would not necessarily withstand scrutiny under the double jeopardy clause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989) (holding that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause may not subject a defendant who has already been punished in a criminal
prosecution to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction does
more than make the government whole); State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla.
1989) (Kogan, J., dissenting; Shaw and Barkett, JJ., concurring) (arguing that the
state's failure to establish a nexus between the forfeited property and the criminal con-
duct renders the forfeiture an impermissible second punishment).
289. 281 So. 2d 1 (1973).
290. Id. at 4.
291. 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991) (McDonald, J., author; Overton, Grimes, and
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amendments substantially reduced preexisting benefits to eligible work-
ers, without providing countervailing advantages, and assertedly vio-
lated article I, section 21. A four-member majority found that the
workers' compensation law remains a reasonable alternative to tort liti-
gation. The majority explained that the law continued to provide in-
jured workers with full medical care and wage-loss payments, regard-
less of fault and without the delay and uncertainty associated with
common law tort remedies.298 Three justices would not have addressed
this claim, believing instead that the statute violated the single subject
requirement 294 and made inappropriate the court's consideration of this
and other constitutional claims. 295
Petitioners in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.296 argued un-
successfully that the legislature failed to provide a reasonable alterna-
tive or demonstrate overpowering necessity when it limited the liability
of long-term lessors of automobiles from negligence of their lessees.
The right to sue the lessors of motor vehicles was the product of recent
common law, 297 not a long-established statute. Thus, the legislature
was free to limit the vicarious liability of long-term lessors, without
complying with the rigors of Kluger 99 Justice McDonald wrote that
such a limitation does not equate to denial of access to courts, and he
added in passing, "particularly when the law is unsettled at the time of
the enactment. 299
Litigants frequently, yet unsuccessfully challenge statutes of limi-
tations and repose on grounds that they deny access to courts. The
Harding, JJ., concurring; Kogan, J., concurred specially with an opinion, with which
Barkett, J., concurred; Barkett, J., concurred in part and dissented in part with an
opinion, with which Shaw, C.J., and Kogan, J., concurred).
292. Ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894.
293. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72.
294. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
295. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring, joined by
Barkett, J.); id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Shaw,
C.J., and Kogan, J.).
296. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991). The case was introduced above. See supra
notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
297. Id. at 333 (citing Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
1959)).
298. Id.; see also Wright v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 So. 2d 1033
(Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (unanimous); Raynor v. De La Nuez, 574 So. 2d 1091 (Fla.
1991) (Ehrlich, J., author; Shaw, C.J., and Overton, Barkett, Grimes, and Kogan, JJ.,
concurred: McDonald, J., concurred in part and dissented in part in an opinion.).
299. Abdala, 583 So. 2d at 333.
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court in Blizzard v. W. H. Roof Co., Inc.3 00 upheld the constitutionality
of two statutes that shortened the period from four years to one year
for bringing a negligence claim against insured tortfeasors whose insur-
ance carrier became insolvent after the cause of action accrued. The
justices adopted the opinion of the district court under review, which
expressed the familiar principle that a statute of limitation does not
deny constitutionally protected access to courts by merely shortening
the period for bringing an action.30' Without elaborating, the court de-
clared that the legislative action was a "reasonable" restriction on the
right of access assured under article I, section 21,302 which was "neces-
sary" to protect the rights of claimant and insured tortfeasor alike. 303
Finally, the most divisive debate over article I, section 21 protec-
tions occurred in Smith v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services,304 where three justices concurred in a plurality decision that
article I, section 21 was "inapplicable" to cases brought by indigents
who sought to receive free transcripts of administrative hearings. 05
They reasoned that the right of appeal to a judicial tribunal provided in
the Administrative Procedure Act" 6 afforded sufficient protection of
300. 573 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1991). This case was introduced in article I, section 2
(equal protection). See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
301. Blizzard v. W.H. Roof Co., 556 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990); see also University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Fla. 1991)
(statute of repose limiting period for medical malpractice claims does not violate article
I, section 21, even when applied to claims accruing after the period had expired) (cita-
tion omitted) (McDonald, J., author; Overton and Grimes, JJ., and Ehrlich, Senior
Justice, concurring; Shaw, C.J., and Barkett and Kogan, JJ., dissented without
opinion.).
302. Blizzard, 556 So. 2d at 1238. The district court panel explained the reason-
ableness of the linkage between the statute of limitation and the purpose to be served in
light of Blizzard's equal protection argument, which we may assume applies equally to
the access to courts argument.
303. Blizzard, 573 So. 2d at 334. This statement is potentially misleading. A
showing of necessity itself is insufficient to sustain a legislative infringement of a right
of access protected under article I, section 21. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4. Moreover,
statutory time bars on initiating claims need only be reasonable. See, e.g., Pullum v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114
(1986).
304. 573 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam). This case was introduced in arti-
cle I, section 9 (due process). See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
305. Id. at 323 (Overton and Grimes, JJ., concurring); id. at 325 (McDonald, J.,
concurring on point).
306. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1985).
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their right of redress."0 7 Chief Justice Shaw concurred in result only,
which leaves in doubt his position regarding the outcome of the consti-
tutional issues, for he may not have disputed the decision of Justices
Overton, McDonald, and Grimes, to grant petitioners relief on the stat-
utory claim.308 Justice Ehrlich, with whom Justices Barkett and Kogan
agreed, dissented on the constitutional issue, charging that the major-
ity's "parsimonious" reading of the Act "facilely avoids the question of
whether the right has any substance in the absence of a transcript."30 9
Justice Ehrlich concluded that "[tlhe plain language of article I, sec-
tion 21 guarantees access to courts . . . .[and that] meaningful judi-
cial review by an article V court" of an administrative proceeding is
essential to the fulfillment of that guarantee. 10
K. Trial by Jury
The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain invio-
late. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than
six, shall be fixed by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22.
This section preserves the right to a jury trial in cases that were
triable before a jury when Florida adopted its first constitution in
1838.311 Without elaboration, the court relied on this section as author-
ity in State v. Rodriguez312 for its conclusion that a defendant who the
state has charged with the crime of felony driving under the influence
has a right to be tried by a jury. 13 In addition, Department of Law
Enforcement v. Real Property"1 4 reaffirmed the well-known principle
that forfeiture proceedings are triable by a jury unless waived, and
307. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 323.
308. Id. at 325 (Shaw, C.J., concurring in result only).
309. Id. at 326 (Ehrlich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Barkett
and Kogan, JJ., concurring).
310. Id. (emphasis in original). The notion that access to courts must be mean-
ingful was echoed in the more recent and unanimous opinion of Real Property, 16 Fla.
L. Weekly at S497, which declared that the right is entitled to all the safeguards of
procedural due process. Id. at S499
311. State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976).
312. 575 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1991). This case is discussed more fully under the
due process section above. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
313. Id. at 1266 n.6.
314. 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S497.
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noted that state due process provides coordinate protection.3 15
L. Right of Privacy
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
This survey period, only Department of Law Enforcement v. Real
Propertys16 relied on Florida's express right of privacy. Residential
property rights derive special protection from article I that is directly
attributed to several coordinate provisions, including the express right
of privacy. 17 Because property rights subject to divestment under the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Acts8" are "particularly sensitive"319
when residential property is at stake, the state is compelled to meet at
a minimum a clear and convincing burden of proof, rather than the
lesser preponderance standard, before it is entitled to forfeit property
under the act.320
Last year, In re Guardianship of Estelle M. Browning321 held that
Florida's privacy amendment protects the right of a person to self-de-
termine purely personal matters of medical health care, and rejected
the interests traditionally relied on by the state to justify its regulation
of a patient's choice to forego or withdraw life-saving procedures. Sev-
eral laws enacted by the regular session of the 1991 Florida Legislature
rode the crest of Browning and are worth noting. Those laws create
statutory rights of privacy on behalf of patients who are subject to the
state's health care system.
Chapter 91-98 creates rights for residents of continuing care facili-
ties by providing, in part, that: "No resident of any facility shall be
deprived of any civil or legal rights, benefits, or privileges guaranteed
315. Id. at S501.
316. Id. at S497
317. Id. at S499 (also relying on FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (inalienable rights),
and 12 (search and seizure)).
318. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.704 (1989).
319. Real Property, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S499.
320. Id. at S500.
321. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
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by law, by the State Constitution, or by the United States Constitution
solely by reason of status as a resident of a facility ... ."" Among
the enumerated rights is the "[f]reedom from governmental intrusion
into the private life of the resident, as provided in s. 23, Art. I of the
State Constitution. 828
Another law, Chapter 91-127, creates the "Florida Patient's Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities,' 324 which directs each health care facility
or provider to observe specific standards. One standard requires respect
for the patient's individual dignity, and acknowledges that patients re-
tain certain "rights to privacy," which it declares to exist without re-
gard to the patient's economic status.3 25
As patients and health care providers test the limits of these statu-
torily created rights in the future, they are certain to present the oppor-
tunity for courts to consider the constitutional dimension of their claims
under article I, section 23.
III. CONCLUSION
No case fosters the principles of article I of the state constitution
more than Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property. A unani-
mous Supreme Court of Florida let stand the Florida Contraband For-
feiture Act, despite the act's widespread disregard of substantive rights,
and interpolated into the text "minimal" due process requirements on
the state when it wields its powers to seize and forfeit private property.
The opinion by Justice Barkett is a fountainhead of state constitu-
tional jurisprudence, and establishes an analytical paradigm of state
due process. Real Property relies explicitly, and exclusively on article I,
in which Floridians have declared for themselves a cluster of basic, fun-
damental property rights, deserving heightened protection from state
encroachment. The opinion describes state due process as a broad con-
cept that is central to the protection of all substantive rights. The deci-
sion provides a valuable precedent to guide courts in rehabilitating,
rather than overturning constitutionally defective laws. The result re-
spects the province of a coordinate branch of state government by leav-
ing the law intact and promoting the implementation of legislative
322. Ch. 91-98, 1991 FLA. LAWS 705.
323. Ch. 91-98, § 9, 1991 FLA. LAWS at 705, 708 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
651.083 (1991)).
324. Ch. 91-127, 1991 FLA. LAWS at 1298.
325. Ch. 91-127, § 1, 1991 Fla, Laws 1298, 1299.
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policy.
Real Property is also noteworthy because it ventured beyond the
perimeter of federal law, which historically established forfeiture policy
involving property, due process, and punishment. This point demon-
strates an important principle of federalism that should not be lost to a
footnote . 2 Florida forfeiture law is now less vulnerable to shifts in fed-
eral forfeiture policy. The decision numbers among others of this court
announcing a level of protection for article I rights that eclipse federal
constitutional analogues27
The court fulfills its most essential mission by deciding constitu-
tional questions.3  State constitutional scholarship is most apparent
when the court grounds a decision explicitly, exclusively, and soundly
on principles of state law. The court legitimizes its divergence from the
federal constitutional base by articulating a well-reasoned decision, and
by relying on policy choices of Floridians reflected, for instance, in tex-
tual distinctions between state and federal constitutions. The court also
fulfills its unique interpretive role in those rare instances when it relies
on its authority to craft rules of constitutional dimension to protect
substantive rights newly-acknowledged in the opinion itself.329 The un-
common occurrence of rule making in this context implies a decision of
profound importance.
Occasionally, the court contributes to state constitutional policy
under circumstances when it is not compelled to decide constitutional
questions. This practice is commendable when the court disregards a
procedural bar and reaches the merits of a constitutional claim due to
"fundamental fairness," 330 although traditionally, the court will not ad-
dress the merits of a claim that is procedurally barred.33 1 Express reli-
ance on state procedural rules is today, more than before, likely to be
accorded finality by federal courts.33 2 Other practices equally should be
encouraged, such as the reliance on dicta to offer insight into seldom-
326. See Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300, 1303 (Fla. 1991) (taking the op-
portunity to correct an erroneous, "tacit assumption" that Florida's Neil decision pro-
vides less protection than Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
327. See Decade Survey supra note 2 at 857-58 (identifying five cases); 1990
Survey supra note 2 at 1129-30 (identifying two cases).
328. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3(b)(l), (3).
329. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 165, 274, 279 and accompanying text.
332. See Coleman v. Thompson, 59 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4796 (U.S. June 25, 1991).
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litigated article I guarantees, s and the issuance of a special concur-
ring opinion to express, clarify, or qualify a position on a fundamental
matter.3 4 This year, the court disregarded a providential rule of self-
restraint and considered a constitutional question said to be particu-
larly important, or extensively argued.388 These cases add a welcome
measure of understanding to the field, even though the rationale for
disregarding the rule is inappropriate, or the holding affords only dubi-
ous precedential value.
As a group, race-based discrimination cases continue to demand
attention. This year, as in the past, strong majority votes characterize
the Neil line of cases, which is designed to rid Florida's courtrooms of
racially discriminatory jury selection practices. s e In these cases, the
court fulfills its traditional role of protecting minorities.
A postscript: the 1991 Florida Legislature created a right of action
to redress interferences by threats, intimidation, or coercion with rights
secured by the state constitution or laws. 3 7 The enactment authorizes
the Attorney General to sue for appropriate relief on behalf of injured
persons., provides that damages shall accrue to those persons, and
prescribes a civil penalty, which enures to the state. Because article I
itself creates no affirmative remedy, the potential that this statutory
sword will vindicate certain violations of article I can only enhance the
importance of the state bill of rights.
333. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 156.
336. See supra notes 251-81 and accompanying text. For other racial discrimina-
tion cases cast in an equal protection context, see supra notes 38-55 and accompanying
text.
337. Ch. 91-74, § 4, 1991 FLA. LAWS 567, 569 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
760.51 (1991)).
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